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Advertising serves “an indispensable role … in a free enterprise 
system.” Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977). 
Without timely information about competing products and sellers, 
especially about their relative prices, consumers cannot make informed 
choices and markets cannot function properly. Restricting truthful 
advertising thus interferes with the efficient operation of a competitive 
market. 
This case involves an antitrust challenge to agreements between 
petitioner 1-800 Contacts and its competitors restricting competitive 
advertising in the online market for contact lenses. The agreements 
allowed 1-800 to maintain higher prices than its rivals by keeping 
consumers in the dark about lower prices elsewhere.  
Competitive information is conveyed to consumers in different 
ways depending on the product and the market. Gas stations on 
opposite corners prominently post their prices on large signs. Stores 
place their house-brand products on the shelf next to the more 
expensive name brands. The online analog to those traditional 
advertising methods is showing consumers an advertisement for one 
2 
company when they search for the name of a rival company. The central 
question in this case is whether the competing sellers may agree to 
limit the comparative advertisements consumers see under the guise of 
protecting their trademarked names. 
Petitioner 1-800 Contacts is the largest and most expensive online 
seller of contact lenses. Its competitors sell the same lenses for less, 
and—until the illegal conduct at issue in this case—they competed 
directly with 1-800 by designating its brand name as a “keyword”—a 
term that causes search engines like Google to display an 
advertisement when a consumer searches for that term. Thus, a 
consumer who searched for “1-800 Contacts” or “cheaper than 1-800 
Contacts” would see competing ads both from 1-800 and its less-
expensive rivals and could then determine who offered the best value.  
Search advertising using brand-name keywords is efficient for 
sellers, beneficial to consumers, and a very effective means of competing 
online. But the competition caused 1-800 to lose sales and, because 
keywords are sold by search engines through competitive bidding, drove 
up 1-800’s advertising costs. To avert these problems, 1-800 started 
filing (or threatening to file) lawsuits against competitors alleging 
3 
trademark infringement. It then settled the disputes by agreeing with 
its rivals to refrain from bidding on one another’s brand names in 
keyword auctions. Although a trademark is infringed only if consumers 
are confused about the source of the product, the settlement agreements 
broadly prohibit advertising without regard to the content of the 
advertisement or whether it is confusing to consumers. Indeed, the 
agreements prohibit advertising in situations where the competitor does 
not even use 1-800’s trademark and infringement is impossible. 
1-800 entered into 14 such agreements covering almost 80% of the 
online contact lens market. The agreements interfered with competition 
by eliminating millions of advertisements for lower-priced rivals. The 
agreements also eliminated rival bidders in millions of keyword 
auctions, reducing the revenue of search companies. 1-800 was thus 
able to continue its profitable business strategy of selling overpriced 
contact lenses to underinformed consumers. 
In the order on review, the Federal Trade Commission found that 
the agreements between 1-800 and its rivals harm competition and 
violate the antitrust laws. Trademark considerations did not justify the 
agreements because the restrictions applied to a broad range of non-
4 
infringing advertising, and 1-800 could have protected its trademark 
rights using less restrictive arrangements. The Commission also found 
that the agreements amounted to bid rigging in keyword auctions. It 
ordered 1-800 to cease entering or enforcing such agreements. 
The thrust of 1-800’s argument on appeal is that its trademark 
claims trump the substantial harm to competition and render its 
actions immune from antitrust law. But as courts consistently 
recognize, while protecting intellectual property can enhance consumer 
welfare, trademark interests can justify interference with the operation 
of competitive markets only when the measures taken to protect the 
trademark are appropriately tailored to avoid infringement. Trademark 
law does not grant carte blanche to destroy competition by restricting 
legitimate advertising by rivals. 
JURISDICTION  
The Commission’s Final Order [JA   -   ] was entered on November 
7, 2018. 1-800 timely filed its petition for review on December 28, 2018. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). 
5 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether 1-800’s advertising restrictions are entirely exempt 
from antitrust scrutiny because they were agreed to in the course of 
settling litigation. 
2. Whether the FTC properly deemed 1-800’s agreements with 
its competitors to suppress competitive price advertising “inherently 
suspect” under the antitrust rule of reason. 
3. Whether substantial evidence supports the FTC’s findings 
that 1-800’s agreements not to compete had actual adverse effects on 
consumers and competition in the online sale of contact lenses and in 
online advertising auctions. 
4. Whether the FTC correctly found that 1-800’s trademark 
rights and saved litigation costs do not justify its restraints of trade. 
5. Whether the remedial terms of the FTC’s Final Order are 
reasonably related to 1-800’s violations of the FTC Act. 
6 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  The Contact Lens Retail Industry 
Contact lenses are a $5 billion industry with over 40 million 
American users. IDF 4-6 [JA   ].1 As medical devices, they can be sold 
only pursuant to a prescription by an optometrist or ophthalmologist. 
Op. 3 [JA   ]. A contact lens prescription specifies both the 
characteristics of the lens (such as size, power, and base curve) and a 
particular manufacturer’s brand (such as “Acuvue Oasys”). Id. Thus, 
competition between brands takes place only at the prescription stage. 
At the retail stage, the vendor may not substitute a different brand, so 
all sellers offer exactly the same lenses. The retail market therefore 
involves only the distribution of a commodity. IDF 23-27 [JA   ]. 
Four categories of retailers sell contact lenses: independent eye 
care professionals (who both provide prescriptions and sell lenses); 
optical retail chains (such as LensCrafters and VisionWorks); mass 
merchants and club stores (such as Walmart and Costco); and so-called 
“pure-play” online retailers (such as 1-800 and its competitors at issue 
                                      
1 “IDF” refers (by finding number) to the Administrative Law Judge’s 
findings of fact [JA   -   ], “Op.” to the Commission’s Opinion [JA   -   ], 
“ID” to the ALJ’s Initial Decision [JA   -   ], and “CX” to the FTC’s 
exhibits introduced at trial. 
7 
here) who sell online and typically have no brick-and-mortar locations. 
Op. 4 [JA   ]. In findings of fact adopted by the Commission, the ALJ 
determined that online sales of contact lenses constitute an antitrust 
product market and that the United States is the relevant geographic 
market. IDF 397-490 [JA   -   ]. 
Although consumers receive identical lenses no matter which 
retailer they choose, 1-800’s prices are substantially higher than those 
of its rival online retailers. Op. 4 [JA   ]; see IDF 691-93 [JA   -   ]. 
Despite 1-800’s higher prices, it leads the market for online sales. Op. 3 
[JA   ]; IDF 67-69 [JA   ]. 1-800 accounts for over 50% of all online sales 
of contact lenses in the U.S. and has the largest share of total contact 
lens sales, online and otherwise. IDF 491-96 [JA   ]. 
B. Internet Search Advertising and Online 
Competition 
1-800 and its rival online retailers extensively use paid internet 
search advertising to attract new customers and build awareness of 
their brands. Op. 5 [JA   ]; IDF 497-98 [JA   ]. Search advertising is an 
essential way for consumers to discover competing retailers and 
compare their prices. Op. 6 [JA   ]; IDF 564 [JA   ]. It is an especially 
8 
efficient marketing tool for small businesses because advertising fees 
accrue only when a consumer clicks on a displayed ad. IDF 563 [JA   ]. 
Online search advertising is particularly important in the contact 
lens retail market because ads are displayed precisely when the 
consumer is primed to buy. Op. 6 [JA   ]. For that reason, most online 
retailers of contact lenses devote much, if not all, of their marketing 
expenditures to online search advertising. Id.; IDF 499, 521-22, 527, 
531, 534, 540, 546, 552, 555 [JA   ,    -   ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    ,    ]. 1-800 too 
advertises heavily online, but it also spends significantly on print, 
radio, television, and other media. Op. 7 [JA   ]; IDF 61-62 [JA   -   ]. 
When an online shopper enters a query into a search engine such 
as Google or Bing, the search engine presents the user with a search 
results page containing two types of listings: “organic” links and 
“sponsored” links. Op. 5 [JA   ]. The organic links are those determined 
by the search engine’s proprietary algorithm to be most relevant to the 
user’s query. Id. They are typically arranged in order of relevance, and 
websites cannot pay to appear on the list. Id. Sponsored results, by 
contrast, are advertisements shown on the results page because the 
linked website paid for them to appear there. Id. The paid results 
9 
typically are differentiated from the organic ones by use of labels (such 
as “Ad” or “Sponsored”); colored or shaded boxes; and a separate, 
clustered position above, below, or to the side of the organic results. Id. 
A search engine determines which advertisements to display in 
response to a query based in part on the query’s relevance to “keywords” 
chosen by the advertiser. Because many merchants are interested in the 
same keywords, search engines sell keywords through auctions. For 
example, in this case a merchant might bid on the keywords “contacts” 
or “contact lenses” so that their advertisements are displayed when a 
consumer looking to buy lenses searches for those terms. (A merchant 
may bid on numerous keywords.) When multiple advertisers bid on the 
same keyword, the ads of the highest bidders are typically displayed 
more prominently on the results page. Op. 5 [JA   ].  
A merchant may also designate how closely the keyword must 
match the consumer’s search query in order for an ad to be displayed. 
Id. For example, Google—the most commonly used search engine—
offers three levels of precision: “broad match,” “phrase match,” and 
“exact match.” Id. “Broad match” focuses on the meaning rather than 
the precise text of the query, so an ad may appear when the search 
10 
engine determines that the query is sufficiently relevant to a keyword 
upon which a merchant has bid. Id. at 5-6 & n.4 [JA   -   ]. When an 
advertiser selects “phrase match,” its ad can appear only when the 
query contains the exact keyword, although additional words before or 
after that keyword are permitted. Id. at 5-6. Thus, a phrase match for 
the keyword “contact lenses,” could display the merchant’s ads in 
response to a search for “best prices for contact lenses.” With “exact 
match,” the ad will appear only when the query contains the exact 
keyword and nothing more. Id. at 6. 
An advertiser may also designate “negative keywords” that ensure 
that its ads do not appear when the query includes those particular 
keywords. Op. 6. A merchant selling eyeglasses, for example, may add 
“wine” as a negative keyword to prevent its ads from appearing in 
response to searches for wine glasses. Like other keywords, negative 
keywords can be designated for broad match, phrase match, or exact 
match. Id. 
C. Competition in the Online Sale of Contact Lenses 
Online contact lens retailers commonly designate their rivals’ 
brand names or trademarks as keywords for search advertising. Op. 7 
11 
[JA   ]; IDF 651-53 [JA   -   ]. Like building a store next to a rival’s 
location or placing a generic product on the same supermarket shelf as 
the brand-name one, using a competitor’s name as a keyword allows 
online merchants to reach the consumers most interested in the 
products that both vendors sell at the moment they are interested in 
buying. 
This digital proximity is particularly important to fostering 
competition when a leading brand (like 1-800) dominates the market. 
IDF 565 [JA   ]. Seventeen percent of all search queries for contact 
lenses included 1-800’s name (or a variation), similar in volume to the 
top three generic terms (“contacts,” “contact,” and “contact lenses”) 
combined. Op. 32 [JA   ]. Most of 1-800’s new customers were led to the 
company’s website by searching for its brand name. Id. 31 [JA   ]. 
Indeed, one-third of consumers knew the name of no online seller other 
than 1-800. Id. 32 [JA   ]. And most online contact lens shoppers do not 
know that 1-800’s competitors offer the same products at lower prices. 
IDF 694 [JA   ]; CX8007_021 ¶56 [JA   ] (in camera). 
The use of rivals’ names as search advertising keywords greatly 
benefits buyers by presenting immediate comparative information at a 
12 
critical moment in the buying process. Op. 32 [JA   ]. That is especially 
so in the online contact lens market, because the advertised products 
are commodities, identical in every respect, and the major difference 
between merchants is price (the Commission found that 1-800’s 
allegedly better service did not explain the price difference, see infra at 
77-78). A consumer who searched for “1-800 Contacts” because she had 
heard of that company would instantly learn that a rival sells the exact 
same product at a lower price.  
D. 1-800’s Response to Mounting Price Competition 
from Rivals: Agreements Not to Compete 
As competition from lower-priced rivals mounted, 1-800 began to 
feel the heat, simultaneously losing sales and paying more in keyword 
auctions. Rivals were bidding against 1-800 to place ads in responses to 
popular searches, including for 1-800’s name. The ads told consumers 
that they could get the same lenses at lower prices than 1-800 offered. 
Unsurprisingly, many consumers who initially set out to buy from 1-800 
instead clicked on rival ads and then opted to purchase lenses from the 
cheaper competitor. IDF 710-718 [JA   -   ]. 1-800’s internal documents 
indicate that “once consumers make a purchase from another online 
retailer, they are unlikely to make their next purchase from 1-800 
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Contacts.” Op. 48 n.51 [JA   ]. 1-800 also internally bemoaned “more 
competitors showing up” on searches for its name, which resulted in 1-
800 receiving “fewer orders.” IDF 713, 714 [JA   ]. 
1-800 responded to the growing competition with a plan to exclude 
competitors from bidding on its brand name (and variations of it) in 
keyword auctions. Doing so would keep consumers uninformed of lower 
prices elsewhere (or even the names of rivals) while lowering 1-800’s 
search advertising costs. As 1-800 expressed internally, reducing 
competing ads in response to searches for 1-800’s trademarks “always 
helps improve performance” in online sales. IDF 712 [JA   ]. With 
respect to keyword bidding, 1-800 noted that “low competition = low 
cost.” CX0051_004 [JA   ]. 
1-800 undertook an aggressive campaign of trademark 
infringement lawsuits and cease-and-desist letters against rival online 
retailers. Op. 7-8 [JA   ]. Its position was that its rivals could not bid on 
its trademarked name as a search advertising keyword or even bid on a 
generic keyword like “contacts” if the effect of doing so was that the 
rival’s advertisement would appear in response to a consumer’s search 
for “1-800 Contacts.” 
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Under Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, trademark 
infringement requires: (1) a protectable mark; (2) unauthorized use of 
that mark; and (3)—the touchstone of trademark infringement—a 
likelihood of consumer confusion. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a); Int’l Info. 
Sys. Sec. Certification Consortium, Inc. v. Sec. Univ., LLC, 823 F.3d 
153, 160 (2d Cir. 2016). 1-800 did not challenge the text of its rivals’ 
ads; its contention was that rivals “used” its mark when they purchased 
it as a search advertising keyword and that consumers were inherently 
likely to be confused when they searched for “1-800 Contacts” and saw 
advertisements for competitors underneath an ad for 1-800—no matter 
what the ads actually said. 
The Tenth Circuit rejected that theory in the only case that 1-800 
litigated to final judgment. In 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 
F. Supp.2d 1151 (D. Utah 2010), the court ruled that a jury could not 
conclude that Lens.com infringed 1-800’s mark for “advertisements that 
did not use [1-800’s] mark in them,” even if the display of those ads had 
been triggered by purchase of “1-800 Contacts” as a keyword. Id. at 
1181. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, stressing the absence of any evidence 
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of confusion. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 722 F.3d 1229, 1242-
43 (10th Cir. 2013). 
Nevertheless, between 2004 and 2013, 1-800 entered into thirteen 
settlement agreements with competitors in which the parties agreed not 
to bid on each other’s trademarks, URLs (web addresses), and 
variations of trademarks as keywords for online search advertising. Op. 
8-9 [JA   ]; IDF 343, 361, 363 [JA    ,   ]. The agreements also required 
the parties to employ negative keywords to prevent their ads from 
appearing in response to a search for the trademarked term even when 
the advertising party did not use the trademark as a keyword. For 
example, if Walgreens purchased the keyword “contacts” but not the 
term “1-800 Contacts,” it was obliged to ensure that a Walgreens ad 
would not appear when a consumer searched for “1-800 Contacts” (and 
vice versa for 1-800). The competing advertisement was restricted even 
though no infringement was possible because there was no “use” of the 
trademark. Op. 9 [JA   ]; IDF 364, 366-68 [JA    -   ]. 
A fourteenth agreement neither settled litigation nor involved a 
trademark dispute. In 2013, 1-800 agreed to perform fulfillment 
services for Luxottica Group by supplying contact lenses to Luxottica’s 
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retail-chain stores including LensCrafters, Pearle Vision, Sears Optical, 
and Target Optical. Op. 10 [JA   ]; IDF 86, 393 [JA   ,    ]. Although 
there was no trademark dispute, the agreement contained reciprocal 
online advertising restrictions similar to those in 1-800’s settlement 
agreements, including the negative keyword requirement for generic 
search terms. Op. 10 [JA   ]; IDF 396 [JA   ]. Altogether, the 14 
agreements challenged by the FTC cover firms responsible for 79 
percent of all domestic online contact lens sales. Op. 33 [JA   ]; IDF 496 
[JA   ]. 
1-800’s strategy worked. Reducing the appearance of competing 
ads in response to consumer searches for its name led to increased 
sales. Op. 33 [JA   ] (citing documents); IDF 710-32 [JA    -   ]. To take 
just one example, when LensWorld stopped bidding on 1-800’s 
trademarked keywords, 1-800’s sales increased the very next week. Op. 
33 [JA   ]. An internal 1-800 document noted that reducing competing 
advertisements “always helps improve performance.” Id. Similar 
documents abound. See, e.g., CX0914_001 [JA   ] (“substantially less 
competitors” buying trademark keywords is “likely helping improve” 1-
800’s sales); CX0564-001 [JA   ] (orders improved significantly with “the 
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removal of a few competitors” bidding on 1-800’s trademarks); 
CX0927_001 [JA   ] (“excellent” sales figures attributable in part to 
“removal of ShipMyContacts from [1-800’s] trademarks”); CX0836_001 
[JA   ] (new customer orders from 1-800’s trademark ads “jumped to 
highest level of the year” due in part to “fewer competitors” appearing). 
E. The Antitrust Enforcement Proceeding Against 
1-800 
In 2016, the FTC issued an administrative complaint against 1-
800, charging it with unreasonably restraining competition in (1) the 
online retail sale of contact lenses and (2) online search advertising 
auctions. See Cmpl. ¶¶3, 28-31 [JA   ,   ]. The FTC charged that 1-800’s 
agreements with its competitors restricted the dissemination of 
truthful, non-infringing advertising about the availability of identical 
products at lower prices, leading consumers to pay higher prices for 
their contact lenses. Id. ¶31 [JA   ]. It also charged that 1-800’s 
restraints undermined search advertising auctions, distorted bidding 
prices, and degraded the quality of service provided by search engines. 
Id. 
The case was tried before an ALJ, who issued an Initial Decision 
concluding that the challenged agreements violated Section 5 of the 
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FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. The ALJ defined a relevant antitrust market 
consisting of the online sales of contact lenses in the United States, IDF 
138, 200 [JA   ,    ], and found that the advertising restrictions 
significantly reduced the availability of information to consumers about 
lower-price competitors. ID 155-56 [JA   ]. As a result, consumers paid 
higher prices than they would have paid in a competitive market. Id. 
The ALJ rejected 1-800’s asserted procompetitive justifications. 
He found that 1-800 failed to show that reducing litigation costs 
benefitted consumers in any way. ID 167-69 [JA   -   ]. He also found 
that trademark protection, while a procompetitive goal, did not justify 
the overbroad advertising restrictions in this case. ID 169-172 [JA   -   ]. 
On 1-800’s administrative appeal, the full Commission reviewed 
the ALJ’s findings and conclusions de novo. 16 C.F.R. § 3.54(a). It 
adopted the ALJ’s findings, and affirmed his conclusion that 1-800’s 
agreements violated Section 5 of the FTC Act. Op. 2-3, 12 [JA   -   ,    ]. 
1. The Effect of Litigation Settlements 
The Commission rejected 1-800’s claim that the Supreme Court’s 
decision in FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136 (2013), immunized 
litigation settlements from any antitrust scrutiny. It determined that 
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Actavis did not create a blanket antitrust exemption for litigation 
settlements. Op. 2, 12-16 [JA   ,    -   ]. 
2.  Application of the Rule of Reason 
The Commission analyzed 1-800’s agreements under the antitrust 
“rule of reason.” The antitrust laws prohibit “unreasonable” restraints 
of trade. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 
98 (1984). Some restraints, deemed “per se” anticompetitive, “would 
always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease 
output” and are therefore “presumed unreasonable without inquiry into 
the particular market context” in which they exist. Id. at 100 (cleaned 
up).2 Others are not automatically deemed harmful, but are assessed 
under the rule of reason to determine if the restraint likely harms 
competition. Op. 17 [JA   ]. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 
246 U.S. 231 (1918); K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. 
Co., 61 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 1995). 
Rule-of-reason analysis uses a burden-shifting regime in which 
the plaintiff (here, the FTC staff who prosecute the case, known as 
                                      
2 This brief uses “(cleaned up)” to indicate that internal quotation 
marks, alterations, and citations have been omitted from quotations. 
See, e.g., Scrimo v. Lee, ___ F.3d ___, No. 17-3434, 2019 WL 3924811, at 
*9 (2d Cir. Aug. 20, 2019). 
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Complaint Counsel) bears the initial burden of proving a prima facie 
case that a restraint (such as 1-800’s advertising restrictions) harmed 
competition. The burden then shifts to the defendant to show 
procompetitive justifications for the restraint, whereupon the burden 
shifts back to the plaintiff to show either that the procompetitive 
benefits could be achieved through less anticompetitive means or that 
the harm to competition outweighs the benefits. See Ohio v. American 
Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018); Major League Baseball 
Properties, Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 317 (2d Cir. 2008). 
3. Prima Facie Case 
The first step of a rule-of-reason analysis “requires the antitrust 
plaintiff to bear the initial burden of demonstrating that the 
defendants’ conduct or policy has had a substantially harmful effect on 
competition.” Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. 
Assocs., Inc., 996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has 
explained that “there is generally no categorical line to be drawn” 
between ways to make the prima facie showing. California Dental Ass’n 
v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999). As a practical matter, however, 
there are three general methods. 
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First, a plaintiff can show that the defendant has sufficient power 
in a relevant market and that the restraint has a tendency to harm 
competition. North Am. Soccer League, LLC v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, Inc., 
883 F.3d 32, 42 (2d Cir. 2018). 
Second, it can show that “an observer with even a rudimentary 
understanding of economics could conclude that the arrangements in 
question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and 
markets.” California Dental, 526 U.S. at 770. The precise showing 
depends on “the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint” and can 
vary from case to case. Id. at 781. Courts have called this the “quick 
look” approach; the Commission calls restraints that can be determined 
to harm competition without an analysis of market power “inherently 
suspect.” See, e.g., Mass. Bd. of Registration in Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 
549, 604 (1988); Polygram Holding, Inc., 136 F.T.C. 310, 344 (2003), 
aff’d, 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005); North Texas Specialty Physicians, 
140 F.T.C. 715, 733 (2005), aff’d, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Third, the plaintiff can prove a prima facie case without an 
“elaborate market analysis” if it shows “actual detrimental effects.” FTC 
v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986) (Indiana 
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Dentists). As this Court has noted, if “a plaintiff can show an actual 
adverse effect on competition,” the law does “not require a further 
showing of market power.” Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 206-07 
(2d Cir. 2001) (cleaned up); accord K.M.B., 61 F.3d at 129; Capital 
Imaging, 996 F.2d at 546. 
The Commission evaluated 1-800’s agreements using the second 
and third modes of analysis. First, it found that the agreements were 
inherently suspect. It examined judicial precedent, economic theory, 
empirical studies of restrictions on price advertising, and the 
importance of advertising in the online contact lens market, and it 
determined that 1-800’s advertising restrictions were likely to have 
anticompetitive effects. Op. 20-22 [JA   -   ]. The agreements “restrict 
the information provided … to consumers” that they could use “to 
compare and evaluate the prices and other features of competing online 
sellers,” at a time when they are likely to buy. Id. Anticompetitive 
effects were especially likely here since the challenged agreements 
affect sellers responsible for 79 percent of all online sales of contact 
lenses and neuter an especially effective means of competition. Id. 30-33 
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[JA   ]. It therefore required no sophisticated analysis to determine that 
the agreements disrupt competition. Id. 22 [JA   ]. 
Second, the Commission found “direct evidence of anticompetitive 
effects.” Op. 42 [JA   ]. 1-800’s advertising and keyword bidding 
restrictions harmed consumers by reducing truthful advertising and by 
increasing prices paid for contact lenses. Id. 42-50 [JA   -   ]. They 
harmed search engines by reducing the number of bidders in keyword 
auctions and thus the prices paid by auction winners, a form of bid 
rigging. Id. 50-52 & n.54 [JA   -   ]. The resulting decrease in displayed 
ads also reduced the quality of the search engines’ product, diminishing 
its value to consumers. Id. 53 [JA   ].  
4.  Procompetitive Justifications 
Having determined that the advertising restrictions harmed 
competition, the Commission shifted the burden to 1-800 to justify the 
harm. The company proffered two justifications: that its agreements 
saved litigation costs and that they are necessary to protect trademark 
rights. Op. 23 [JA   ]. The Commission found both justifications facially 
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plausible, id., but rejected them as insufficient to justify the 
anticompetitive conduct.3 
The Commission found that 1-800’s trademark interests did not 
justify its broad advertising restrictions. Op. 25-30 [JA   -   ]. It 
identified less anticompetitive alternatives that would have protected 
1-800’s trademark rights effectively. For example, 1-800 could have 
required prominent disclosures of rival sellers’ identities or a 
prohibition of specific advertising text that was likely to confuse 
consumers. Id. at 27 [JA   ]. 
Moreover, because the prohibited ads were not confusing to 
consumers, the trademark rights at stake could not justify the 
restrictions. Op. 38-41 [JA   -   ]. For one thing, no theory of trademark 
protection could explain the negative keywords requirement. It is 
“beyond dispute that a competitor cannot be held liable for purchasing a 
generic keyword to trigger an advertisement that does not incorporate a 
                                      
3 Following the framework it had set forth in Polygram, the 
Commission first engaged in a “preliminary analysis” of the justifi-
cations, then considered a “more detailed showing” of rebuttal by 
Complaint Counsel, and then considered 1-800’s response to the more 
detailed showing before conclusively determining that the advertising 
restrictions were anticompetitive. Op. 22-41. We have simplified the 
analysis here, but the bottom line is identical. 
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holder’s mark in any way.” Id. at 41 [JA   ]. And 1-800’s keyword-
bidding theory of confusion did not meet the “minimum threshold of 
validity” required to justify suppression of truthful advertising, because 
“the weight of authority overwhelmingly points to non-infringement.” 
Id. at 40 [JA   ]. 
 The Commission also found that 1-800 failed to show that its cost 
savings from litigation settlements actually provided any “tangible, 
verifiable benefit to consumers.” Op. 37 [JA   ]. Moreover, the same 
litigation costs would have been saved by settling on terms less harmful 
to competition. Id. at 27 [JA   ]. 
In the absence of any argument or evidence sufficient to overcome 
the showing that the challenged agreements were anticompetitive, the 
Commission concluded that 1-800’s actions were unfair methods of 
competition in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. Op. 54 [JA   ]. 
One Commissioner dissented. In his view, the challenged 
agreements should have been analyzed under the fullest-scope rule of 
reason framework, and the Commission should have accorded 
dispositive weight to 1-800’s trademark rights. Dissent 1 [JA   ]. He also 
disagreed with the majority’s evaluation of the direct evidence of 
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anticompetitive harm. To the dissent, the evidence did not show actual, 
sustained, and substantial harm. Id. 
The Commission entered a cease-and-desist order that bars 1-800 
from enforcing the agreements’ anticompetitive terms and entering into 
new agreements that unreasonably limit online search advertising or 
limit participation in search advertising auctions. Op. 54-58 [JA   -   ]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1-800 Contacts, the best-known and highest-priced online seller of 
contact lenses, entered into classic horizontal restraints of trade with 
nearly all of its rivals. The companies—together accounting for almost 
80% of online contact lens sales—agreed not to advertise against one 
another by forgoing using each other’s brand-names as internet search 
keywords. By doing so, they cut off a critical channel of competitive 
advertising and deprived consumers of a very effective means of 
learning—at the moment they wanted to buy—that lower prices were 
available elsewhere. Having made it harder for consumers to learn they 
could get cheaper lenses from a competitor, 1-800 could sell overpriced 
contact lenses to underinformed consumers. 
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1-800 does not seriously contest that its advertising restrictions 
interfered with competition. Instead, it tries to excuse its 
anticompetitive behavior on the ground that the agreements were 
necessary to protect its trademark rights. But such rights, properly 
understood, are to be applied in a manner consistent with antitrust law. 
They may not be invoked as trump cards against antitrust enforcement 
or as excuses for anticompetitive agreements that go far beyond the 
rights protected. 
In particular, a trademark protects only against uses of the mark 
that are likely to confuse consumers, yet 1-800’s restrictions greatly 
exceed that limited scope. Under the agreements challenged here, 
competitors may not use each other’s brand-names as keywords even if 
the ads displayed are not confusing to consumers. Those agreements 
prevent a consumer searching for “1-800 Contacts” from seeing an ad 
stating “We are not 1-800 Contacts but we offer lower prices.” That ad 
could confuse no one, but the agreements ban it anyway. Worse, the 
negative keyword requirement makes competitors withhold their ads 
when consumers search for “1-800 Contacts” even when the competitor is 
not using that trademark. 1-800’s advertising restrictions thus extend 
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far beyond the limits of its trademark rights, denying consumers 
competitive price information with no genuine offsetting benefit.  
1-800’s attempts to evade responsibility for its anticompetitive 
conduct fall flat. 
1. The Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis does not immunize 
trademark settlement agreements from antitrust scrutiny. Just the 
opposite; the Court expressly rejected that idea and ruled that a patent 
settlement can be examined under the antitrust laws. Nor did the Court 
excuse “commonplace” settlements from antitrust review. The Court 
made clear that any settlement of an intellectual property dispute can 
be subject to antitrust scrutiny. The Commission determined in any 
event that the settlements here were not “commonplace,” both because 
they tied up most of the market and because they ban advertising 
without regard to trademark infringement. 
2. The Commission found a prima facie case of anticompetitive 
effects, sufficient to shift the burden of justification to 1-800, under two 
different methods. Either is sufficient to uphold the judgment. 
a. The commodity nature of the retail market for contact lenses, 
economic theory of advertising restrictions, empirical studies, and 
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judicial experience with restraints on competitive advertising all permit 
a “confident conclusion about the principal tendency” of the advertising 
restrictions to harm competition. California Dental, 526 U.S. at 781. 
The Commission thus properly determined that 1-800’s advertising 
restrictions are inherently suspect. In a commodity market, depriving 
consumers of critical price information at the time of a purchasing 
decision has an obvious tendency to distort “the price-setting 
mechanism of the market.” Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461-62. 
Understanding why requires no sophisticated economic learning, 
making this a textbook case for applying the “inherently suspect” 
framework. 
The restrictions on keyword bidding in search engine auctions call 
even more clearly for treatment as inherently suspect. Agreements by 
competitors not to bid against one another—bid rigging—are routinely 
held per se unlawful. It follows a fortiori that they satisfy a prima facie 
case of harm. 
1-800 mainly attacks the inherently suspect framework itself, not 
the Commission’s application of it to the facts of this case. But the 
Supreme Court has ratified the approach time and again, even when 
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the Court declined to apply it in a particular case. And at least three 
courts of appeals have upheld the Commission’s use of it. 1-800’s 
hyperbolic claim that deeming the restrictions inherently suspect 
“virtually eliminated” the FTC’s burden under the rule of reason is a 
caricature of the agency’s careful analysis in this case. In reality, the 
Commission found a prima facie case and shifted the burden of 
justification to 1-800 only after a close examination of the restraints in 
their market context, and it then engaged in a thorough analysis of 
whether the restraints were justified. 
b. The Commission found direct evidence that the advertising and 
keyword bidding restrictions adversely affected competition by 
substantially reducing price advertising, which caused consumers to 
pay more for contact lenses, and by reducing competitive bidding, which 
lowered auction revenue for search engines. The record amply supports 
all of those findings. 
1-800 is wrong that the effects found by the Commission cannot 
constitute a prima facie case of anticompetitive harm. California Dental 
does not support that claim. The Supreme Court reiterated there that 
“price advertising is fundamental to price competition.” 526 U.S. at 773. 
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The Court declined to find that restricting advertising in a market for 
professional services had anticompetitive effects because the link 
between advertising and competition there was unclear. Here, as the 
Commission found, the link is very clear. 
Clorox likewise does not support 1-800. The restriction there 
prevented a single competitor from calling its product a specific 
trademark-infringing name. The restrictions in this case, in sharp 
contrast, cut off an entire channel of price advertising central to contact 
lens sales, even where there is no risk of trademark infringement. And 
the restrictions apply not just to one competitor, but to 14 of them, 
accounting for the vast majority of the market. 
The Commission was not required to show a decrease in the sales 
of contact lenses in order to show anticompetitive effects. Output 
reductions are one type of anticompetitive effect, but they are not the 
only one. And the Commission did show that 1-800’s agreements not to 
advertise caused a reduction in advertising—by more than 100 million 
ads. 
American Express does not require the Commission to find that all 
consumers in the market were made worse off by 1-800’s advertising 
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restrictions. That case involved a “two-sided” market, and the Court 
held that the antitrust inquiry had to consider both sides of the market, 
not every single consumer in the market. The contact lens market is not 
a two-sided market, and it is enough that some subset of buyers was 
harmed, which the Commission found. Nor does American Express 
require a finding of abnormally high profit margins. That may be one 
way to find anticompetitive harm, but it is not the only one. Equally 
valid is a finding of pricing above competitive levels, which the 
Commission found and 1-800 does not dispute. The price difference 
cannot be explained by “brand preference”; indeed, 1-800 recognized 
internally that once consumers used another merchant “we’ve lost 
them.” 
3. 1-800’s trademark rights do not justify its anticompetitive 
conduct. A justification for a restraint of trade must be reasonably 
necessary to achieve its objectives, but 1-800’s advertising restrictions 
are far broader than necessary to protect its trademarks. They prohibit 
advertisements even where the text of the ad ensures that consumers 
could not be confused and—due to the negative keyword requirement—
even in situations where the rival advertiser does not use the 
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trademark at all. 1-800 offers no reason to think that consumers could 
be confused. 
The Commission properly rejected the theory that a consumer who 
searches for “1-800 Contacts” but also sees ads for rivals would be 
sufficiently confused, without regard to the text of the competing ad, to 
justify banning the advertisements completely. Courts and 
commentators too have rejected that theory, and even if it were not a 
sham, it is insufficient to justify the broad interference with competition 
presented here. 
1-800 and its amicus are wrong that the company’s investment in 
its brand earns it the right to prohibit competitive advertising that “free 
rides” on its name by using it as a search keyword. Accepting that claim 
would transform the limited protection granted by a trademark into the 
broad use exclusivity conferred by a patent. In fact, brand-based 
keyword advertising is the digital equivalent of a drugstore placing the 
house brand ibuprofen next to Motrin. Customers come looking for the 
famous brand, but they may opt for the cheaper alternative instead—
much to their benefit. That is simply the nature of competition. 
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Finally, 1-800’s litigation cost savings do not justify its 
anticompetitive advertising restrictions. Cost savings cannot salvage 
overbroad restrictions when less restrictive alternatives are readily 
available. Nor can they justify anticompetitive conduct at all in the 
absence of any evidence that the savings offset the anticompetitive 
effects and thereby benefited consumers. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
On judicial review, “[t]he findings of the Commission as to the 
facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(c). 
“Supported by evidence” is the same as “substantial evidence.” Bristol-
Myers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 1984). The standard 
demands “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 
adequate to support a conclusion.” Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 
31 (2d Cir. 2004) (cleaned up). The Commission’s legal conclusions are 




 TRADEMARK SETTLEMENTS ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM 
ANTITRUST SCRUTINY 
The principal theme of 1-800’s brief is that because its agreements 
to restrict advertising were reached through the settlement of 
trademark disputes, they are immune from the application of antitrust 
law. It argues first that the Supreme Court’s decision in Actavis 
established a general antitrust immunity for settlements of intellectual 
property litigation, with a narrow exception for settlements that are not 
“commonplace.” Br. 39-50. Oddly, 1-800 relies largely on the dissent in 
Actavis and on cases abrogated by the Court’s decision. In fact, Actavis 
rejected the idea that a settlement of patent litigation, commonplace or 
otherwise, is immune from antitrust review.  
Actavis concerned a so-called “reverse-payment” settlement in 
which the plaintiff, a patent holder, paid the defendant, a generic drug 
company that allegedly infringed the patent, to settle the case. 570 U.S. 
at 141, 155. As part of the settlement agreement, the generic company 
agreed not to compete with the patented drug for several years. The 
FTC charged the parties to the collusive agreement with an antitrust 
violation. 
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Several courts of appeals had rejected similar challenges, but the 
Supreme Court overruled those decisions and affirmed that traditional 
antitrust principles apply to patent-litigation settlements and that 
patent law confers no general immunity on them. The Court 
emphasized that there was “nothing novel about [its] approach,” id. at 
151, and discussed numerous decisions going back eight decades that 
“make clear” that patent settlements have never been exempt from 
antitrust scrutiny. Id. at 149-151 (citing United States v. Singer Mfg. 
Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 
371 (1952); Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163 
(1931)). Indeed, the Court faulted the lower court for ignoring the role of 
antitrust law in determining the scope of protection from competition 
that a patent bestows on its owner. Id. at 147-49 (citing Walker Process 
Equip., Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); 
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (1948); United States v. 
Line Material Co., 333 U.S. 287 (1948)).4 
                                      
4 The Court explained that the antitrust concern at issue was the 
agreement by competitors to preserve and share monopoly profits. 570 
U.S. at 156, 157. The concern was not, as 1-800 wrongly claims, the 
“exclusion of competition from the market.” Br. 42. 
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The principle reiterated in Actavis that intellectual property 
rights confer no general immunity from antitrust law applies equally to 
trademarks. That much is clear from this Court’s decision in Clorox Co. 
v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997), which assessed a 
trademark-litigation settlement under antitrust law. The Court 
considered the settlement of a dispute between the owners of the 
trademarks LYSOL and PINE-SOL, which had been deemed 
confusingly related. Soon after Clorox acquired the rights to PINE-SOL, 
it brought an antitrust challenge to a trademark litigation settlement 
that its predecessor-in-interest had entered, claiming that the 
agreement restrained competition without justification because there 
was no longer a likelihood of consumer confusion between the two 
marks. Id. at 52. This Court engaged in an in-depth antitrust analysis 
of the settlement agreement. Id. at 55-61. The analysis would have been 
unnecessary if the agreement was simply exempt from antitrust 
scrutiny.5  
                                      
5 Likewise, in California Packing Corp. v. Sun-Maid Raisin Growers of 
Cal., 165 F. Supp. 245, 250-51 (S.D. Cal. 1958), aff’d, 273 F.2d 282 (9th 
Cir. 1959), the court dismissed an antitrust challenge to a trademark 
settlement agreement after a thorough analysis of the exclusionary 
reach of the settlement agreement. 
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1-800 is wrong that the holding in Actavis is limited to the unique 
reverse-payment settlement at issue there and does not apply to 
“commonplace” settlements. The claim rests on the false premise that 
intellectual-property-litigation settlements are generally exempt from 
antitrust law and that Actavis created an exception to that general rule.  
That approach cannot be squared with Clorox or with the 
Supreme Court’s reliance on cases applying antitrust scrutiny to a wide 
range of patent-litigation settlements. Singer, for example, held that 
patent settlement agreements were subject to (and violated) the 
antitrust laws. 374 U.S. at 195-97. New Wrinkle found unlawful a price-
fixing scheme embodied in a patent-litigation settlement. 342 U.S. at 
373-74, 380. Standard Oil (Indiana) found the patent settlement 
agreements lawful, but subjected them to a searching antitrust analysis 
and warned that they were close to the line of illegality. 283 U.S. at 
167-170, 174. As the D.C. Circuit explained, “intellectual property 
rights do not confer a privilege to violate the antitrust laws.” United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (cleaned up). 
Rather, the idea that the exercise of intellectual property rights “cannot 
give rise to antitrust liability” is “no more correct than the proposition 
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that use of one’s personal property, such as a baseball bat, cannot give 
rise to tort liability.” Id. 
Ignoring that considerable body of law, 1-800 mistakenly relies, 
out of context, on a passing statement in Actavis that “commonplace” 
forms of settlement have not been deemed subject to antitrust liability. 
570 U.S. at 152. The Court made that observation in response to the 
dissent’s argument that antitrust liability for reverse-payment 
settlements is not triggered solely because the plaintiff paid the 
defendant. Sometimes, the dissent explained, the patent holder ends up 
paying the alleged infringer due to a counterclaim. Id. at 151-52. The 
majority explained that “[i]nsofar as the dissent urges that settlements 
taking these commonplace forms have not been thought for that reason 
alone subject to antitrust liability, we agree, and do not intend to alter 
that understanding.” Id. at 152 (emphasis added). In other words, 
commonplace settlements without any additional indication of 
anticompetitive harm do not give rise to antitrust liability. Here, the 
Commission found multiple indications that the settlements cause 
anticompetitive harm. 
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1-800 also incorrectly claims that the FTC itself acknowledged in 
its brief in Actavis and its recent decision in Impax that the Actavis 
decision created an exception for reverse-payment cases to the general 
antitrust immunity of intellectual property settlements. Br. 46-47, 49. 
Not so. The FTC’s Actavis brief said that settlements generally do not 
violate the antitrust laws, and that pharmaceutical settlements 
generally do not raise antitrust concerns. Brief for the Petitioner 26-28, 
FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., No. 12-416 (S. Ct. Jan. 2013). It did not 
suggest that intellectual property settlements are generally immune 
from antitrust scrutiny at all. The Commission’s Impax decision 
likewise does not suggest that patent settlements are immune from 
antitrust scrutiny; it considered the reverse payment at issue in 
applying the antitrust rule of reason. Opinion of the Commission 15-16, 
Impax Labs., Inc., FTC Dkt. No. 9373 (Mar. 28, 2019). 
Even if the antitrust laws did not apply to “commonplace” 
settlements, however, the Commission found that the settlements 
challenged here are not commonplace. Op. 13-14. Comparing them with 
the routine non-use settlement at issue in Clorox shows why. The 
settlement agreement in Clorox did “no more than regulate how the 
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name PINE-SOL may be used” in product labels, ads, or other 
promotional material. 117 F.3d at 57; see id. at 54 (describing the 
settlement’s non-use terms). Clorox was free to produce and sell 
products in direct competition with LYSOL, “so long as they are 
marketed under a brand name other than PINE-SOL.” Id. at 57. 
Here, by contrast, 1-800’s settlements ban rival advertising 
generated by specific search terms, without regard to the content of the 
advertisements or what rivals are called. It does not matter if 1-800’s 
competitors take steps (such as clear disclosures) that eliminate any 
risk of consumer confusion. Op. 14, 27. And the settlements require the 
use of negative keywords to ensure that there will be no competitive 
advertising even when the competitor is not using 1-800’s mark in any 
way. The restrictions on keyword bidding shut down an entire channel 
of advertising and extend far beyond anything the Court considered in 
Clorox. 
Moreover, the restrictions in Clorox applied to only one competitor 
in a market that “is the battleground of some of the largest corporations 
in the country, wielding numerous megabrands.” 117 F.3d at 58. Here, 
the settlements apply to “rival after rival,” restricting competing 
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advertisements from 14 online vendors that account for 79 percent of 
the market. Op. 33 [JA   ]; IDF 496 [JA   ]. They undermine the price-
setting mechanism of the market and affect competition itself. Op. 20, 
35 [JA   ,    ]. 
Given the overbreadth of the settlement agreements, 1-800 is 
wrong that the Commission could resolve this case only by deciding 
disputed questions of trademark law. Br. 47. As shown above, some of 
the advertisements barred by the settlements do not even use 1-800’s 
marks and therefore plainly go beyond the scope of trademark 
protection. As to ads that do use the marks, the Lanham Act prohibits 
only confusing use, and the Commission determined that any consumer 
confusion could have been averted through disclosures that make the 
identity of the vendor clear. Op. 27-30 [JA   -   ]. A restraint of trade 
cannot be justified if “the objective [of the restraint] can be achieved by 
a substantially less restrictive alternative.” PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST 
PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶1502 (3rd & 4th eds., 2019 Cum. 
Supp. 2010-2018) (Areeda & Hovenkamp). And in any event, the 
Commission explained that the overwhelming consensus of judicial and 
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expert opinion is that keyword searching based on trademarked terms 
is not by itself confusing and thus cannot justify broad and 
anticompetitive advertising restrictions. Op. 38-40 [JA   -   ]; see infra 
88-90. 
Finally, because Actavis did not create a rule that commonplace 
settlements are exempt from antitrust scrutiny, 1-800’s claim that its 
agreements do not fall within the exceptions to such a rule fails from 
the start. Br. 45-50; see Actavis, 570 U.S. at 153-58. The claim lacks 
merit anyway for the reasons that the Commission articulated. Op. 16 
[JA   ]. Actavis warned of settlements that pose a risk of unjustified and 
genuine adverse effects on competition. 570 U.S. at 153-57. Here, the 
advertising restrictions do just that in the vast majority of the market. 
Op. 33 [JA   ]. The restraints also amount to bid rigging in keyword 
search auctions. Id. 19-22, 30-34, 50-54 [JA   -   ,    -   ,    -   ]. Actavis 
makes clear that “courts need to take more seriously the 
anticompetitive consequences of challenged horizontal agreements.” 
Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶2046.d6. 
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 THE COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT 1-800’S 
ADVERTISING AND KEYWORD BIDDING RESTRICTIONS ARE 
INHERENTLY SUSPECT  
The Commission properly held that in the market for online sales 
of contact lenses, 1-800’s restrictions were likely enough to cause 
anticompetitive harm that “no elaborate industry analysis [was] 
required” to shift the burden to 1-800 to show procompetitive 
justifications for them. Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459. 
The restraints on head-to-head keyword advertising present a 
textbook case for applying the inherently suspect framework. It takes 
only basic common sense, not a Ph.D. in economics or a sophisticated 
antitrust background, to see that when direct-rival merchants agree to 
keep consumers from knowing at the critical moment of a purchasing 
decision that better prices are available elsewhere, competition will 
suffer. The “circumstances, details, and logic” of 1-800’s advertising 
restrictions permit “a confident conclusion about the principal 
tendency” the restrictions will have in the market. California Dentists, 
526 U.S. at 781. The same is true of the restriction on competitive 
bidding, which plainly distorts the “price-setting mechanism of the 
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market” and resembles agreements that have been condemned as per se 
illegal. Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461-62. 
A. 1-800’s Advertising Restrictions Were Likely to 
Cause Anticompetitive Effects in the Online 
Contact Lens Market 
The Commission analyzed the nature and effect of 1-800’s 
advertising restraints in the market as well as economic and judicial 
experience with similar restraints, which together showed that the 
restrictions were likely to harm competition. Those are the factors that 
courts have used when applying (and upholding) an inherently suspect 
analysis. See Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 456-58; Polygram, 416 F.3d 
at 37; North Texas Specialty Physicians, 528 F.3d at 362-67; North 
Carolina State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 374 (4th 
Cir. 2013). 
Operation of the advertising restrictions in the market. In 
the online retail market, contact lenses are a commodity: the 
prescription requires the consumer to get a specific lens, so all 
merchants sell identical products. Op. 3 [JA   ]; IDF 23-27 [JA   ]. Price 
is the primary—and often only—basis for competition and is the 
emphasis of much of the competing advertising. Op. 20 [JA   ]. Yet, by 
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preventing consumers from learning about rivals’ lower prices when 
they search for “1-800 Contacts”—the most popular search term—the 
restrictions prevent direct price competition a substantial part of the 
time. Consumers are kept in the dark about critical information at the 
very moment they are poised to buy. Worse, the negative keyword 
requirement in 1-800’s agreements means that competing ads will not 
appear in response to a search for “1-800 Contacts” even when 
competitors bid on generic keywords like “contacts.” 
The Commission found that the advertising restrictions are 
“agreements between horizontal competitors to restrict the information 
provided by advertising to consumers when they search for” terms 
including 1-800’s trademarks. Op. 20 [JA   ]. The record showed that 
price is “the top purchasing criterion” for online shoppers. IDF 706-07 
[JA   ]. Without the restriction, “consumers could have used that 
withheld information to compare and evaluate the prices and other 
features of competing online sellers.” Op. 20 [JA   ]. Instead, 
“information enabling consumer comparisons [was] more difficult and 
costly to obtain.” Id. Moreover, “[o]nline search is one of the key 
methods by which consumers discover vendors and compare products 
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and services,” id., and is the principal advertising expenditure, id. 6-7 
[JA   ]. 1-800’s restrictions thus struck at the heart of where and how 
competition takes place in the online contact lens market. 
Economic theory. The Commission explained that “[e]conomic 
theory indicates that restrictions on [online search] advertising are 
likely to harm competition.” Op. 20 [JA   ]. As a matter of basic 
economic logic, online shoppers who lack competitive price information 
will tend to pay more than they would have if they knew they could get 
the exact same lenses for less money. Even more persistent shoppers 
will have to try harder to learn about their options by performing 
multiple searches. Compounding the harm, the advertisements barred 
by 1-800’s restrictions would have been presented to the consumer at 
the time he was most likely to make a purchase. Id. 6, 30 [JA   ,    ]; IDF 
498 [JA   ].  
Empirical studies. Economic studies further confirm that 
1-800’s advertising restrictions were likely to have anticompetitive 
effects. Economic expert witness Dr. David Evans testified to the 
“consensus in the economics literature that restrictions on advertising 
among rivals impair competition and harm consumers.” CX8006_081 
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(Evans Expert Report) [JA   ]. Dr. Evans reviewed 21 empirical studies 
assessing the effects of advertising restrictions on various aspects of 
competition, including prices. Id. at 081-82 [JA   -   ]. All but one study 
(which examined advertising for non-commodity professional services) 
found that advertising restrictions led to higher prices, and many of 
those studies showed that consumers get no benefits (like higher quality 
or better service) in return. Id. Online advertising is no different. Dr. 
Evans reported that empirical studies show that price comparison 
websites, which allow consumers to compare prices easily, lead to lower 
prices for products as diverse as life insurance and cars. Id. 
Judicial experience with similar restraints. Courts and 
commentators have long recognized the value to consumers of price 
advertising and the harm from restricting it. “[W]here consumers have 
the benefit of price advertising, retail prices often are dramatically 
lower than they would be without advertising.” Bates, 433 U.S. at 377 
(citing, inter alia, Benham, The Effect of Advertising on the Price of 
Eyeglasses, 15 J. Law & Econ. 337 (1972)). In California Dental, the 
Supreme Court found “unexceptionable” the ideas that “price 
advertising is fundamental to price competition and that restrictions on 
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the ability to advertise prices normally make it more difficult for 
consumers to find a lower price and for [sellers] to compete on the basis 
of price.” 526 U.S. at 773 (cleaned up). Likewise, the Court found it 
“clear as an economic matter” that “restrictions on fare advertising” 
have a “significant effect” upon airfares. Morales v. Trans World 
Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 388 (1992). A restriction on providing 
information important to consumer purchasing decisions is “likely 
enough to disrupt the proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism 
of the market that it may be condemned even absent proof that it 
resulted in higher prices.” Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461-62. 
1-800’s advertising restrictions also bear a “close family 
resemblance” to similar restrictions “that already stand[] convicted in 
the court of consumer welfare.” Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37. Limiting 
head-to-head advertising amounts to the digital equivalent of 
agreements to allocate territory. 1-800 and its rivals effectively agreed 
to divide the cyber terrain so that consumers who searched for 1-800’s 
trademarks would not be tempted by a competitor’s offerings (and vice-
versa). Similar agreements “on the way in which [rivals] will compete 
with one another” have been deemed “unreasonable as a matter of law.” 
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NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99. In Blackburn v. Sweeney, 53 F.3d 825, 828 (7th 
Cir. 1995), for example, the court found that an agreement to limit 
advertising to different geographical regions “sufficiently approximates 
an agreement to allocate markets so that the per se rule of illegality 
applies.” See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); 
Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46 (1990) (per curiam). 
The restrictions also resemble advertising bans that the Supreme 
Court and this Court have held unlawful, including a ban on 
prescription drug price advertising, Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), a ban on attorney 
advertising, Bates, 433 U.S. 350, and a ban on advertising liquor prices, 
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996). This Court 
similarly upheld an FTC order forbidding doctors from agreeing not to 
advertise. Am. Med. Ass’n v. FTC, 638 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1980), aff’d by 
an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 676 (1982) (per curiam). Courts have 
“recognized time and again that agreements restraining autonomy in … 
advertising impede the ordinary give and take of the marketplace.” 
Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37 (cleaned up).  
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In the online contact lens market, a ban on keyword search 
advertising is often tantamount to a complete ban on advertising. More 
than one-third of consumers are aware of only the “1-800 Contacts” 
brand; as many people search for that brand name as search for 
“contact,” “contacts,” and “contact lenses” combined. Op. 32 [JA   ]. That 
substantial segment of consumers is robbed of the chance to learn that 
they can get the exact same lenses for less money elsewhere. Thus, the 
restrictions directly affect “a consumer’s opportunity to see a 
competitor’s ad in the first place.” Op. 22 [JA   ].6 As the Commission 
explained, “that some advertising remained unrestrained does not 
excuse a restraint affecting a competitively significant subset of ads.” 
Op. 34 [JA   ]. 
The Commission did not need to rely only on cases involving 
“trademarks, settlements, or search advertising” as 1-800 contends. Br. 
56. Restrictions on advertising reduce competition whether they involve 
trademarks or not and whether they are the result of settlements or 
other collusive agreements—and they warrant quick-look review on 
that basis alone. Inherently suspect analysis requires only that there be 
                                      
6 For that reason, 1-800 is incorrect that the advertising ban cases are 
inapposite here because they involved total bans on advertising. Br.57.  
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a “close family resemblance” with the challenged restraint, not an 
identical twinship. Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37; see also Indiana Dentists, 
476 U.S. at 458; North Texas Specialty Physicians, 528 F.3d at 362. The 
principal question now is whether a prima facie case of anticompetitive 
conduct exists; considerations that might justify that conduct, such as 
intellectual property rights, are analyzed later (which the Commission 
did at length, see Op. 22-30 [JA   -   ]). 
B. 1-800’s Bidding Restrictions Amount to Bid Rigging 
for Brand-Name Advertising Keywords 
The Commission also properly deemed inherently suspect 1-800’s 
bidding restrictions in advertising keyword auctions held by search-
engine companies. Op. 50-51 n.54. The Supreme Court has deemed 
bidding restrictions anticompetitive without the need for “elaborate 
industry analysis,” even in the context of professional conduct rules, 
which generally merit greater deference. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). This Court likewise recognized 
that bid rigging is per se illegal. State of N.Y. v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 
840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 
290, 293-94 (2d Cir. 1981). See also United States v. MMR Corp., 907 
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F.2d 489, 496 (5th Cir. 1990) (“backing away from bidding” constitutes 
per se illegal bid rigging). 
C. 1-800’s Criticisms of the Inherently Suspect 
Framework Are Baseless 
1-800’s arguments amount largely to an attack on the inherently 
suspect doctrine itself. It caricatures the approach as “theories and 
suspicion,” as “rarely used,” and as an attempt by the Commission to 
shirk its duty of inquiry through “a dramatic departure from the default 
rule of reason.” Br. 50-51, 61. 1-800 does not seriously address the 
Commission’s thorough analysis of the extensive record. 
Courts long have recognized that an abbreviated rule-of-reason 
analysis is appropriate where it is sufficiently obvious that a particular 
restraint will cause harm to competition. The Supreme Court approved 
such an approach in Indiana Dentists, finding the Commission’s 
analysis justified by “common sense and economic theory.” 476 U.S. at 
456. Courts of appeals approved of it in Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37; North 
Texas Specialty Physicians, 528 F.3d at 352; and North Carolina Dental 
Examiners, 717 F.3d at 374; cf. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 
290, 329-330 (2d Cir. 2015) (Opinion of Livingston, J.). Indeed, even 
when the Supreme Court has disapproved its application in particular 
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contexts, as it did in Actavis and California Dental, the Court has 
consistently recognized the validity of the approach. It may not be used 
often, but that is because relatively few practices are so plainly 
anticompetitive as 1-800’s advertising restrictions. 
1-800’s description of the inherently suspect approach invoked by 
the Commission here is distorted. It claims that the analysis allowed 
the Commission to “virtually eliminate” its burden under the rule of 
reason, Br. 50, engage in “near-summary condemnation” of 1-800’s 
agreements, Br. 51, 60, and declare that, from now on, “advertising 
regulations, as a category, are inherently suspect,” Br. 54. All of those 
descriptions are phony. 
In reality, the Commission extensively analyzed the effect of the 
advertising restrictions on the market and 1-800’s justifications for 
them and concluded that Complaint Counsel had met “the requirements 
of the rule of reason to support liability.” Op. 35 [JA   ]. The only aspect 
of rule-of-reason analysis the Commission did not perform was the 
initial determination that 1-800 had market power in the online contact 
lens market before it shifted the burden to 1-800 to show procompetitive 
justifications. See Polygram, 136 F.T.C. at 344 (inherently suspect 
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means that “scrutiny of the restraint itself … without consideration of 
market power” is sufficient). In all other respects, the analysis was 
identical to the traditional rule of reason. The Commission examined in 
great detail 1-800’s justifications and found them wanting, but that is 
by no means “summary condemnation” akin to per se illegality. The 
Commission’s approach, while less than “the fullest market analysis,” 
was “meet for the case.” California Dental, 526 U.S. at 779, 781. 
Furthermore, the Commission expressly disclaimed the view “that 
all advertising restrictions are necessarily inherently suspect.” Op. 22 
[JA   ]. The Commission assessed the specifics of the online contact lens 
market to determine that 1-800’s advertising restrictions were “likely, 
in this particular context, to harm competition.” Id. 34 (cleaned up; 
emphasis added) [JA   ]. 
In 1-800’s hyperbolic characterization, the Commission wholly 
ignored trademark rights in deciding this case. Br. 58 (faulting the 
Commission for not taking into account the restraints’ “roots in 
trademark law”). But the time to address such an issue is at the 
justification stage of the inquiry, not the prima facie stage, where the 
question was whether Complaint Counsel showed a prima facie case of 
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harm to competition sufficient to shift the burden. That issue does not 
turn on trademark rights. 
Moreover, because the Commission found 1-800’s trademark 
justification “cognizable and plausible,” it required Complaint Counsel 
to make a “more detailed showing” that the advertising and bidding 
restrictions are “likely, in the particular context, to harm competition.” 
Op. 18-19 [JA   -   ]. Indeed, the Commission devoted a large portion of 
its 59-page opinion to a detailed analysis of the issue, addressed in 
Section IV below. 1-800 is just wrong to claim the Commission “simply 
assume[d]” that its trademark claims were invalid. Br. 60. 
Finally, relying on dicta in two cases, 1-800 argues that, in this 
Circuit, once a defendant “has shown a procompetitive justification” for 
its conduct, the plaintiff is required to “abandon” the truncated analysis 
“and proceed to a full-blown rule of reason.” Br. 60 (citing Madison 
Square Garden, L.P. v. Nat’l Hockey League, 270 F. App’x 56, 58 (2d Cir. 
2008) (summary order); Bogan v. Hodgkins, 166 F.3d 509, 514 n.6 (2d 
Cir. 1999)). As we discuss below, 1-800 did not show a procompetitive 
justification for its restraints; at most, it raised the possibility of a 
justification, which it ultimately failed to prove. 
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In any event, Madison Square Garden and Bogan do not stand for 
the proposition that after the burden has shifted to the defendant, an 
allegation of procompetitive justification requires the Commission to go 
back and reconsider whether the burden should have shifted in the first 
place. That approach would nullify the inherently suspect doctrine, 
contrary to the Supreme Court’s repeated endorsement of it. At most, 
Bogan and Madison Square Garden recognize that if a defendant 
establishes procompetitive justifications as a matter of fact, then the 
adjudicator may not condemn a practice without assessing whether it 
harms competition or the procompetitive benefits can be achieved 
through less anticompetitive means. The Commission analyzed both. 
D. Actavis, California Dental, and Clorox Do Not 
Foreclose the Inherently Suspect Analysis in This 
Case 
1-800 claims that the decisions in Actavis, California Dental, and 
Clorox preclude use of an inherently suspect analysis. Br. 51-55. They 
do not. 
a. In Actavis, the Supreme Court rejected the use of quick-look 
analysis to assess all “reverse payment” settlements of pharmaceutical 
patent disputes. The Court did not, as 1-800 suggests, determine that 
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litigation settlements may never be deemed inherently suspect. It held 
only that in the context of pharmaceutical reverse payments the 
likelihood of anticompetitive harm depended on facts specific to each 
agreement, including the size, scale, and independence of the payment, 
and industry specifics. 570 U.S. at 159. No such concerns apply to the 
advertising restrictions at issue here. Decades of judicial decisions and 
economic learning have recognized that such restraints pose significant 
competitive concerns, and the Commission thoroughly analyzed the 
market specifics that made past teaching applicable to the online sale of 
contact lenses. 
Indeed, Actavis stressed that its holding did not “require the 
courts to insist” on a full-press rule-of-reason analysis in all cases. Id. 
Rather, the Court reiterated its determination in California Dental that 
there is “always something of a sliding scale in appraising 
reasonableness,” so “the quality of proof required should vary with the 
circumstances.” Id.; 526 U.S. at 780. 
Contrary to 1-800’s contention (Br. 52), the non-exclusionary 
nature of trademark rights makes the agreements at issue here more 
troubling, not less. Unlike patent rights, which forbid all unauthorized 
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use of an invention, trademark rights protect against unauthorized use 
of the mark only to the degree it will likely cause consumer confusion. 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). But 1-800’s agreements restrict competitive 
advertisements and keyword bidding without regard to whether the ads 
could have confused consumers. Competing ads are barred even if they 
expressly say that the merchant is not 1-800. Worse, by mandating 
negative keywords, they forbid competitive advertising that does not 
use 1-800’s trademarks at all. 
b. California Dental also does not support 1-800’s position. To the 
contrary, California Dental acknowledged that “price advertising is 
fundamental to price competition” and that “[r]estrictions on the ability 
to advertise prices normally make it more difficult for consumers to find 
a lower price and for [sellers] to compete on the basis of price.” 526 U.S. 
at 773. The Court thus recognized the “general rule” that “restrictions 
on advertisement of price and quality” have anticompetitive tendencies. 
Id. at 771; see Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶2023 (consumers generally 
benefit from more information, and restrictions on information raise 
consumers’ search costs). 
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The Court declined to condemn the advertising restriction adopted 
by the dentists because of issues unique to the market for professional 
dental services. The “comparability of [dental] service packages [is] not 
easily established,” and both consumers and competitors had “difficulty 
… get[ting] and verify[ing] information” about those services. 526 U.S. 
at 771. Moreover, because the dentists had far more information about 
the services at issue than the patients, advertising restrictions may 
have been procompetitive by preventing false or deceptive advertising. 
Id. The market for dental services therefore lacked the “normal linkage” 
between advertising restrictions and market effects. Op. 42 [JA   ]. In 
that situation, the restricted advertising might not have enhanced 
competition. 526 U.S. at 771, 773. 
By contrast, in the online retail contact lens market—a commodity 
market driven by price competition—there is no reason to question 
whether restricting advertising will harm competition. The general rule 
that restrictions on price and quality advertising impair competition 
applies with full force. But the Commission did not rely on that fact 
alone in finding 1-800’s agreements inherently suspect: it also identified 
a slew of specific factors, discussed above, that make the expected 
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anticompetitive effects especially likely. Its analysis was “less quick” 
and “more sedulous.” Id. at 781.7 
c. The Commission’s analysis is also consistent with this Court’s 
decision in Clorox, which did not involve inherently suspect analysis. 
See Br. 53. The parties settled trademark litigation with an agreement 
that prevented Clorox from labeling a disinfectant a particular name, 
PINE-SOL, deemed to be confusingly similar to the mark LYSOL. 
Rejecting Clorox’s antitrust claim, the Court concluded that there was 
no reason to believe that the agreement would harm competition 
because it restricted only the name under which the product could be 
sold, not the sale of the product. Moreover, the market had a large 
number of other competitors who were not limited by the agreement. 
117 F.3d at 57. As the Commission observed, in Clorox “the court saw a 
jilted competitor who wanted to use an antitrust claim to negotiate a 
better trademark settlement.” Op. 33 [JA   ]. 
                                      
7 1-800 mistakenly relies on Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises., 
Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir. 1985), as requiring a complete rule of reason 
analysis of a covenant not to compete. Br. 54. The court there did not 
consider whether to apply a quick-look analysis; the question was 
whether the agreement at issue was per se unlawful. The court applied 
the rule of reason because the restraint was ancillary to the parties’ 
building a joint facility “that would expand output.” 776 F.2d at 189. No 
claim of ancillary benefit is present here. 
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Nothing in Clorox remotely suggests a bar on using a quick-look 
analysis to assess agreements banning online keyword advertising and 
involving 80% of a market. To the contrary, the Court warned against 
agreements that “in reality serve to divide markets.” 117 F.3d at 55.8 
 THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND DIRECT EVIDENCE OF 
ANTICOMPETITIVE EFFECTS 
As an alternative means of determining that Complaint Counsel 
had established a prima facie case of competitive harm, the Commission 
found direct evidence that 1-800’s advertising and bidding restrictions 
(1) resulted in a substantial reduction in price advertising that 
(2) caused consumers to pay more for their contact lenses, (3) caused 
search engines to receive lower prices for search advertisements, and 
(4) lowered the quality of search engine results. Those findings are 
                                      
8 American Express is inapposite, as that case involved a vertical 
agreement between a service provider and its customers, not a 
horizontal agreement between competitors, which the Supreme Court 
explained “is markedly different” for antitrust purposes. 138 S. Ct. at 
2290 n.10; 2285 n.7. Vertical agreements are less concerning because 
they “are a customary and even indispensable part of the market 
system” and the parties are not competitors. Areeda & Hovenkamp 
¶1902d. Had American Express conspired horizontally with Visa and 
MasterCard to deprive consumers of information, the case would have 
been very different. 
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supported by substantial evidence, and each finding independently 
supports a prima facie case. 
A. 1-800’s Agreements Reduced Price Advertising and 
Interfered with Price-Setting Mechanisms 
The Commission found that 1-800’s advertising restrictions 
reduced the volume of advertising for low-price online sellers of contact 
lenses and disrupted information flow in the market. 
“A concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more costly) 
information desired by consumers … is likely enough to disrupt the 
proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market that it 
may be condemned even absent proof that it resulted in higher prices.” 
Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461-62. Likewise, where brokers adopted 
rules limiting access to real estate listings, a reduction in the 
availability to consumers of such advertising constituted direct evidence 
of competitive harm. Realcomp II, Ltd., FTC Dkt. No. 9320, 2007 WL 
6936319, at *40-42 (Oct. 30, 2009), aff’d, 635 F.3d 815, 831-34 (6th Cir. 
2011). 
1-800’s advertising restrictions are directly analogous to those in 
Indiana Dentists and Realcomp. As discussed above, the restrictions 
deprived consumers of information that would have enabled them to 
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“compare and evaluate the prices and other features of competing 
online sellers,” who offered identical commodity products distinguished 
mainly by price. Op. 3, 20, 32 [JA   ,    ,    ]. Online search advertising, 
moreover—in particular, keyword advertising based on 1-800’s brand 
name—was essential to both 1-800 and its online rivals in attracting 
customers and capturing a consumer’s attention at the critical moment 
of sale. See id. 6-7 (summarizing evidence), 22, 30-32 [JA   -   ,    ,    -   ].  
The Commission found considerable direct evidence showing that 
the agreements sharply reduced competitive advertising and sales: 
• Competitors who had advertised in response to consumer 
searches for 1-800’s trademarks stopped doing so almost 
entirely after the agreements. They testified that, but for the 
restrictions, they would have continued advertising using 1-
800’s trademarks. Op. 43 [JA   ]. 
• One expert estimated that the advertising restrictions 
eliminated 114 million ads between 2010 and 2015. Op. 45 
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[JA   ]; IDF 755 [JA   ].9 Another estimated that the 
restrictions reduced competitors’ ads from 1.85 to 0.54 per 
search. Op. 44 [JA   ]; IDF 749 [JA   ]. 
• The elimination of ads led to fewer “clicks” taking consumers 
to rivals’ websites. One expert estimated that, but for the 
restrictions, clicks on rivals’ ads would have increased by 
145,000. Op. 45 [JA   ]; IDF 756 [JA   ]. Another expert 
estimated that clicks on rivals’ ads would have increased by 
3.5 clicks per 100 searches. Op. 44 [JA   ]; IDF 750 [JA   ]. 
• Consumers who saw rivals’ ads when searching for 1-800’s 
trademarks clicked on those ads and purchased contacts 
from those rivals. Data from rival vendors shows a high level 
of “conversions” (sales from clicking a link) from ads 
generated by searches for “1-800 Contacts.” IDF 596-609, 
617-623, 662-669, 670-680 [JA   -   ,    -   ,   -   ,   -   ]. 1-800 
                                      
9 This expert analysis drew on the experience of online retailer 
Memorial Eye, which offered significantly lower prices than 1-800, and 
which continued to advertise against 1-800 after being sued. Memorial 
Eye bid on generic keywords such as “contacts,” and its ads were 
displayed when a consumer searched for 1-800’s brand name. Op. 44-45 
& n.47 [JA   -   ]. 
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recognized that “[i]f they’ve gone online somewhere else—
we’ve lost them.” CX1117_023 [JA   ]. 
This evidence firmly supports the Commission’s conclusion that 
“the Challenged Agreements cut off advertising in a way that interfered 
with the operation of competitive forces in the online sale of contact 
lenses and disrupted consumers’ mechanisms for comparing and 
selecting between alternative online sources.” Op. 45 [JA   ]. This is 
precisely the type of “disrupt[ion]” of price setting that the Supreme 
Court condemned in Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 461-62. 
In response, 1-800 does not challenge the Commission’s findings. 
It contends only that these anticompetitive effects do not establish a 
prima facie case as a matter of law. The arguments lack merit. 
1. California Dental and Clorox support the 
Commission’s finding of anticompetitive harm 
1-800’s principal claim is that under California Dental and Clorox, 
direct evidence of decreased advertising is legally insufficient to state a 
prima facie case. In fact, those cases support the Commission’s ruling. 
First, 1-800 contends that California Dental held that advertising 
restrictions, “standing alone,” cannot constitute anticompetitive harm 
as a matter of law. Br. 65 (citing 526 U.S. at 776). To the contrary, 
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California Dental recognized that “price advertising is fundamental to 
price competition” and that “[r]estrictions on the ability to advertise 
prices normally make it more difficult for consumers to find a lower 
price and for dentists to compete on the basis of price.” 526 U.S. at 773. 
As described above (at 59-61), California Dental declined to apply 
the general rule disfavoring advertising restraints to the market for 
dental services because special factors not present in commodity 
markets indicated that the restricted advertising would not necessarily 
enhance competition. 526 U.S. at 771, 773. As discussed, contact lenses 
are a commodity product that consumers readily understand and for 
which price is the principal means of competition among online vendors. 
As shown in part III.B below, the advertising restrictions led to higher 
prices. 
Nor does Clorox support 1-800’s argument. The parties’ agreement 
there prevented a single competitor from labeling a product with a 
particular trademark-infringing name. It did not restrict advertising, 
and there were multiple other competitors in the market. The Court 
found no reason to believe that competitive harm would result from that 
narrow restriction. See Clorox, 117 F.3d at 57. 
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This case bears no resemblance to Clorox. 1-800’s advertising 
restrictions did not limit what competitors could label their products; 
they cut off an entire channel through which rivals could tell consumers 
that they offered the exact same products at a lower price, even where 
the advertising presented no risk of consumer confusion. The 
restrictions went to the heart of a central means of competition in the 
market. And unlike in Clorox, they applied not just to one competitor 
but to 14 of them, accounting for most of the market. Clorox warns 
against agreements “that in reality serve to divide markets,” 117 F.3d 
at 55-56, which is precisely what 1-800’s restrictions accomplish. See 
Op. 14, 33 [JA   ,    ]; ID at 161-162 [JA   -   ]. 
2. The Commission was not required to show an 
overall decrease in the sales of contact lenses 
1-800 claims that the Commission was required to find a reduction 
in “output”—i.e., total sales of contact lenses. Br. 65-67. The claim fails 
because “[a]lthough output reductions are one common kind of 
anticompetitive effect in antitrust cases, a ‘reduction in output is not 
the only measure of anticompetitive effect.’” O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 
F.3d 1049, 1070 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Areeda & Hovenkamp 
¶ 1503b(1)); see also American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284 (describing 
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“‘proof of actual detrimental effects,’ such as reduced output, increased 
prices, or decreased quality”) (cleaned up; emphasis added). 
California Dental did not hold otherwise. That case does not stand 
for the proposition that only output reduction can lead to competitive 
harm; indeed, the Court recognized that, generally, “raising price, 
reducing output, and dividing markets have the same anticompetitive 
effects.” 526 U.S. at 777 (cleaned up). Instead, the Court addressed 
when advertising restrictions can be a proper measure of (or proxy for) 
output for purposes of showing anticompetitive harm. The issue was 
whether certain dentists’ rules on advertising content were sufficiently 
likely to harm competition to warrant an abbreviated rule of reason. Id. 
at 771-78. The Court confirmed the “general rule” that “restrictions on 
advertisement of price and quality” have anticompetitive tendencies. Id. 
at 771. But it held that rule inapplicable to the “professional context” of 
dental services because particular aspects of that market—including 
information asymmetry between dentists and patients that rendered 
some advertising claims unverifiable—distinguished it from “normal” 
commercial markets, and meant that the restricted advertising would 
not necessarily aid competition. Id. at 771-74. By contrast, 1-800’s 
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restrictions affected a commodity market where consumers can readily 
verify sellers’ claims; restricted price advertising—the principal means 
of competition; and barred advertising regardless of content. Unlike in 
California Dental, there is no reason to doubt that, here, restricting 
price advertising harms competition, and 1-800 supplies none. 
Indiana Dentists and Realcomp did not, as 1-800 wrongly 
contends, involve “reductions in output of the underlying services.” Br. 
67 n.16. To the contrary, as the Commission explained, the x-rays in 
Indiana Dentists were not offered as a separate product independent of 
dental treatment. Op. 46 [JA   ]. They were only information used to 
assess the need for treatment and insurance coverage. The Court’s 
analysis focused not on the “output” of x-rays as an end in itself, but on 
“the informational role of x-rays and the harm to market mechanisms 
that would flow from withholding that information.” Id.; see 476 U.S. at 
461-62. Similarly here, the decline in competitive price advertisements 
shows an anticompetitive effect without a separate showing that the 
output of contact lenses also fell. As the leading antitrust treatise 
recognizes, “[a]greements restricting advertising are a form of output 
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restriction in the production of information useful to consumers.” 
Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶2023b. 
In Realcomp, the Commission likewise did not require a reduction 
in the number of “real estate listings” or in the number of home sales. 
Instead, the restraints found anticompetitive in Realcomp—like those 
here—had the purpose and effect of keeping consumers in the dark 
about the availability of lower-priced options for brokerage services. See 
Realcomp, 2007 WL 6936319, at *10, 12-13, 25-27, 40-42. They were 
thus condemned because they denied “competitively significant 
information” to consumers looking to buy a house. 
3. The Commission showed that the agreements 
caused an actual reduction in advertising 
Finally, 1-800 argues that even if a reduction in advertising 
demonstrates anticompetitive harm, the Commission proved no such 
reduction. Br. 67-68. The claim simply ignores the extensive findings, 
including two econometric models, discussed at length in the 
Commission’s Opinion and in the Initial Decision. Op. 44-45 [JA   -   ]; 
IDF 743-756 [JA   ]. As discussed above (at 64-66), one expert testified 
that consumers saw 114 million fewer competitive ads due to 1-800’s 
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restrictions, and another testified that the restrictions reduced 
competitor advertising to less than one third of expected levels. Id. 
1-800 speculates that its competitors may have shifted advertising 
dollars to other keywords, resulting in no net reduction in competitive 
advertising. Br. 67-68 & n.17. But the evidence showed that competitors 
allocated keyword bidding budgets based on the return-on-investment 
generated by a particular keyword, and that they did not shift spending 
to cost-ineffective keywords after agreeing not to advertise head-to-head 
with 1-800. Op. 44 n.46. No further evidence was required. 
B. 1-800’s Advertising Restrictions Led to Increased 
Online Contact Lens Prices 
Higher prices are the “paradigmatic example[]” of antitrust harm. 
NCAA, 468 U.S. at 107. The Commission correctly found that reduced 
price advertising led to higher online prices for contact lenses. Op. 46 
[JA   ]. That finding independently establishes a prima facie case.  
1. Substantial evidence showed that the advertising 
restrictions led to higher prices and sales diverted 
to 1-800 
1-800 admits that its prices were higher than those of its online 
competitors. Br. 70; see Op. 46 [JA   ]; IDF 691-93 [JA   -   ]. The 
evidence showed that the advertising restrictions diverted sales away 
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from lower-price sellers and allowed 1-800 to maintain artificially high 
prices: 
• Documents and testimony showed that consumers were 
generally unaware that contact lenses from 1-800 cost more 
than from other online vendors. Op. 47 & n.50 [JA   ]; IDF 
694-98 [JA   -   ]. 
• Economic models showed that the suppression of rival ads 
and consequent reduction in clicks on rival ads caused 
diversion of sales from lower-price rivals to higher-price 1-
800. Op. 46-47 [JA   -   ]. One expert estimated that, but for 
the restrictions, lower-priced rivals’ sales would have been 
12.3% higher, lowering the average price paid in the whole 
market. Op. 45 [JA   ]. 
• 1-800’s own internal analyses showed that when rival ads 
appeared in response to consumer searches for 1-800’s 
trademarks, 1-800’s sales decreased, and conversely that the 
suppression of rival ads led to increased sales for 1-800. IDF 
710-731 [JA   -   ]; ID 155-56 [JA   -   ]. 
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• Retailer data showed that sales by 1-800’s online rivals 
increased when their ads appeared in response to searches 
for 1-800’s trademarks. IDF 618-623, 662-669 (Memorial 
Eye) [JA   -   ,    -   ]; IDF 596-609, 670-680 (Lens Direct) [JA   
-   ,    -   ]. 
• 1-800 responded to price competition with a price-match 
policy offering to meet or beat competitors’ prices. IDF 436-
440 [JA   ]; see Op. 47 [JA   ]. Price-matching rose 
substantially as more consumers saw lower-price 
advertising. CX8009_071-072 ¶127 (Evans Rebuttal Expert 
Report) [JA   ]. 
This evidence establishes conclusively that the advertising 
restrictions “insulate[d] 1-800 Contacts from normal competitive forces,” 
“divert[ed] sales from low-priced sellers to a high-priced seller,” and 
“directly interfered with consumers’ ability to trigger [price] discounts.” 
Op. 47 [JA   ]. As a result, consumers paid higher prices than they 
would have absent 1-800’s restrictions. Id. 
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2. 1-800’s responses lack merit 
1-800 levies a barrage of attacks on the Commission’s finding of 
price effects. It complains that the Commission (1) did not prove higher 
prices for all consumers; (2) did not prove that 1-800 garnered 
“abnormally high” profit margins; (3) failed to disprove 1-800’s claim 
that its higher prices are justified by its “stronger brand”; (4) used 
analyses that were insufficiently “rigorous” and “precise” and relied on 
“mere theory”; and (5) did not define a relevant market. All of these 
arguments fail. 
“All consumers.” First, 1-800 claims that this Court’s decision in 
American Express requires the Commission to show that the 
advertising restrictions made all consumers in the market “worse off 
overall,” not just those who overpaid for lenses. Br. 64 (citing United 
States v. American Express Co., 838 F.3d 179, 205 (2d Cir. 2016)). The 
argument rests on an out-of-context quote; the case does not stand for 
that proposition. 
American Express involved a “two-sided” market, in which the 
credit card processor simultaneously served both merchants that accept 
credit cards and consumers who use them. The Court held that proof of 
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harm to merchants did not by itself establish a prima facie case because 
the inquiry had to consider both sides of the market—i.e., the “market 
as a whole.” The Court made clear that the phrase referred to “both 
cardholders and merchants,” not to every single participant in the 
market. 838 F.3d at 204-05. As one court recognized, the antitrust laws 
“exist to protect competition, even for a targeted group that represents a 
relatively small part of an overall market.” FTC v. Staples, Inc., 190 F. 
Supp.3d 100, 126 (D.D.C. 2016).10 
Profit margins. 1-800 next asserts that the FTC’s direct price-
effects evidence is insufficient because the Commission did not show 
that 1-800’s profit margins increased during the relevant period. Br. 70. 
This Court observed in American Express that proof of “abnormally 
high” margins is one way to prove anticompetitive effects, 838 F.3d at 
205, but it also stated that the government could meet its initial burden 
in other ways, including by showing “supracompetitive pricing.” Id. at 
                                      
10 Nor do MacDermid Printing Solutions LLC v. Cortron Corp., 833 
F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2016), or CDC Tech., Inc. v. IDEXX Labs., Inc., 186 
F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999), aid 1-800. In MacDermid, an antitrust challenge 
to a vertical restraint was dismissed because there was “no evidence 
that even a single customer” was harmed, through higher prices or 
otherwise. 833 F.3d at 186. Similarly, in IDEXX, the plaintiff offered no 
evidence of harm either to rivals or to consumers. 186 F.3d at 80-81. 
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205-06. The Commission found that 1-800’s prices were higher than 
they would have been without its restrictions, which meets that test. It 
was not required also to prove increasing profit margins.11 
But even assuming that 1-800’s margins did not increase—when 
they would have been expected to decline in response to competitive 
pressure—that still would be consistent with the Commission’s finding 
of harm. See Op. 49 [JA   ]. Evidence that “prices did not fall” is 
“consistent” with a finding of adverse effects. McWane, Inc. v. FTC, 783 
F.3d 814, 839 (11th Cir. 2015); accord Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 
F.3d 928, 937 (7th Cir. 2000) (“to prevent a price collapse through 
coordination of action among competitors … is sufficient proof of actual 
anticompetitive effects”). 
Brand preference. 1-800 claims that the Commission “failed to 
account for obvious factors” that could have explained why consumers 
would pay higher prices for a commodity product, such as a preference 
for “the strength of 1-800 Contacts’ brand.” Br. 71. But the Commission 
found that consumer preference did not explain 1-800’s higher prices. 
                                      
11 In any event, 1-800’s blanket assertion concerning its margins, Br. 
70, provides “no basis to conclude that they were properly measured.” 
Op. 49 [JA   ]. 
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The evidence, including 1-800’s own documents, showed that informed 
consumers choosing between 1-800’s “brand” and lower-priced rivals 
regularly chose the rival. See Op. 48-49 [JA   -   ]. Indeed, an 
independent evaluation of 1-800’s business found that its “premium” 
pricing was “unsustainable” “given the commodity-like nature of contact 
lenses and 1-800’s insufficiently distinguishable service.” CX1109_003 
[JA   ]. 1-800’s rivals also disputed the proposition that 1-800’s service 
was superior. Op. 48 [JA   ] (collecting testimony). 
1-800’s price-match policy—spurred directly by competitive 
pressure from lower-price online rivals—further undermines 1-800’s 
claim that its higher prices were justified. When rivals advertised lower 
prices, 1-800 responded not by showing consumers that the higher price 
was worth it because its brand was better or its service superior, but by 
lowering its prices. Op. 49 [JA   ]. As the Commission explained, “the 
need for 1-800 Contacts to offer a price-match policy suggests that the 
service differential is insufficient to offset the price premium.” Id. 
Insufficiently precise quantification. 1-800 admits that it had 
higher prices than its competitors, but asserts that the Commission did 
not sufficiently quantify the difference. Br. 72. As the Commission 
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explained, the law does not require calculation of the “precise 
competitive price” to establish that the existing price is above the 
competitive level. Id. Proof that depriving consumers of truthful 
advertising caused them to incur higher prices is sufficient. 
Thus, in North Carolina Bd. of Dental Examiners, 152 F.T.C. 640 
(2011), the Commission found “a precise quantification of the price 
increase … unnecessary” in light of the “obvious disruption of the 
proper functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market.” Id. at 
686 (cleaned up). The Fourth Circuit affirmed that finding. 717 F.3d 
359. Similarly, in Toys “R” Us, the Commission did not require a precise 
quantification of the competitive price where, but for defendant’s 
restraints, retail prices would have been lower. 126 F.T.C. 415, 561-64 
(1998). Affirming that decision, the Seventh Circuit held that “no more 
elaborate market analysis was necessary.” 221 F.3d at 937. 
“Mere theory.” 1-800 next asserts that the Commission’s direct 
evidence of price effects is “mere theory” offered by Complaint Counsel’s 
experts. Br. 73. In fact, the evidence rests on undisputed facts of 1-800’s 
higher prices and on econometric models, credited by the Commission, 
which together support the conclusion that without the advertising 
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restrictions prices likely would fall, because (i) consumers would opt for 
the lower-price sellers rather than 1-800, thus forcing 1-800 to lower its 
own prices; and (ii) 1-800 would be forced to price-match more often, 
even if its list prices remained high. Op. 44-45, 47 [JA   -   ,    ]. As both 
experts testified, the increased availability (and visibility) of price 
information, combined with consumer switching, “would put downward 
pressure on prices.” IDF 741 [JA   ]; Op. 46-47 [JA   -   ]. 
The models are supported by record evidence showing that before 
1-800 cut off competitive advertisements consumers did shift away from 
high-price 1-800 to its lower-price rivals, IDF 720-21 [JA   ], and 1-800 
had to price-match far more often. Evans Tr. 1608-1617 [JA   -   ] (in 
camera); CX8009_071-72 ¶127 (Evans Rebuttal Expert Report) [JA   ] 
(in camera); CX8006_104 ¶227 (Evans Expert Report) [JA   ]. The 
experts’ opinions “derive from the facts in the record” and “provide 
empirical evidence, not economic theory isolated from facts.” Op. 48 [JA   
]. 
Relevant market. Finally, 1-800 argues that the Commission’s 
analysis of price effects is “flawed” because it simply “assum[es]” a 
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market “limited to the sale of contact lenses online” without defining or 
proving “any relevant market.” Br. 69 n.18. 
The claim is flatly wrong. The ALJ found that “[o]nline sales of 
contact lenses constitute a relevant product market.” IDF 397 [JA   ]; 
see id. 398-490 [JA   -   ]. The Commission adopted the ALJ’s findings of 
fact, which included market definition. Op. 12 [JA   ]. 
Even if the Commission had not defined a market, in cases 
challenging horizontal restraints of trade, a prima facie case based on 
direct evidence of harm does not require the court “to precisely define 
the relevant market” to conclude that agreements are anticompetitive. 
American Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2285 n.7. “The purpose of the inquiries 
into market definition and market power is to determine whether an 
arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition,” so proof of actual detrimental effects makes those 
inquiries superfluous. Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61. 
C. 1-800’s Keyword Bidding Restrictions Harmed 
Search Engines 
Collusion between buyers that harms sellers violates the antitrust 
laws. E.g., Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 
219 (1948). Direct evidence showed that 1-800’s bidding restrictions had 
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two anticompetitive effects on search engines selling advertising 
keywords: reducing their revenues and degrading the quality of their 
advertising product. 
1. Reduced revenues 
The bidding restrictions depressed auction prices for keywords, 
thereby reducing search engines’ revenues. As described above, 1-800 
and its rivals agreed not to bid against one another in millions of search 
auctions. They agreed not to bid both on one another’s trademark 
terms, and on generic terms where doing so would result in the 
appearance of a rival’s ad in response to a search for the trademark. See 
Op. 51 [JA   ]. An agreement by rivals not to bid in a competitive 
auction obviously lowers the winning bid and reduces the seller’s 
revenue. 
Evidence from major search engines Google and Bing showed that 
“cost per click” bids fell. Op. 51-52 [JA   -   ]. 1-800’s own documents 
described its strategy as enforcing trademark policy “to remove 
competitors which in turn drives down how much we pay per click.” 
CX0935 [JA   ]. Or as succinctly put in one document, “low competition 
= low cost.” CX0051_007 [JA   ]. It worked: expert analysis credited by 
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the Commission estimated that 1-800 was able to reduce its winning 
bids substantially. Op. 52 [JA   ]; CX8006_076 ¶168 (Evans Expert 
Report) [JA   ]; Evans Tr. 1648-50 (in camera) [JA   -   ]. 
 1-800 complains that the Commission did not define a relevant 
market for paid search advertising, Br. 74 n.22, but for the reasons 
discussed above (at 81), where there is direct evidence of actual 
anticompetitive effects, an antitrust plaintiff is not required to also 
define a market or offer proof of market power. 
1-800’s claim that any reduction in search engines’ revenues was 
“infinitesimal,” Br. 74, lacks support. A substantial fall in per-click 
prices, multiplied by millions of clicks, is hardly negligible.12 
CX8006_077 ¶169 (Evans Expert Report) [JA   ]. 1-800’s argument boils 
down to a claim that the harm could have been worse, but that is no 
defense to an anticompetitive horizontal restraint. 
 1-800 speculates that competitors may have shifted their 
advertising budgets to other keywords. Br. 75. The evidence discussed 
above (at 72) shows otherwise. 
                                      
12 1-800 attempts to characterize this impact as a mere “reduction in 
the prices of certain sales,” Br. 74, but the same could be said about per 
se unlawful bid rigging agreements. 
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Finally, 1-800 asserts that online retailers who were not party to 
the agreements could have filled in the search engines’ revenue gap by 
bidding on 1-800’s trademarks. Br. 75. The claim strains credulity both 
because the restrictions cover nearly 80% of the market and because 1-
800 aggressively pursued every online retailer that dared bid on its 
trademarks. See IDF 319, 323-331, 371-392 [JA   -   ,    -   ]. 
2.  Reduced quality of search advertising product 
The Commission also found that ads eliminated by the bidding 
restrictions “reduced the quality” of search results and “diminished the 
value of search engine service to consumers,” thereby harming both 
search engines and consumers. Op. 53 [JA   ]. Specifically, expert 
testimony showed that over 100 million more ads would have been 
displayed but for the agreements. Id. Witnesses from the major search 
engines testified that a larger pool of ads increases the search engine’s 
ability to provide both pertinent search results and higher-quality 
advertising. Id. 1-800 does not challenge the Commission’s finding, 
which is supported by substantial evidence. 
1-800 contends instead that a direct showing of reduced quality 
does not establish a prima facie case of anticompetitive harm because it 
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is “novel.” Br. 73. But the Supreme Court has long recognized that 
“decreased quality” is a form of “actual detrimental effects,” American 
Express, 138 S. Ct. at 2284, and this Court has agreed, MacDermid, 833 
F.3d at 182. 
 THE COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND 1-800’S ASSERTED 
PROCOMPETITIVE JUSTIFICATIONS INSUFFICIENT 
1-800 advanced two justifications for its advertising restrictions 
that, it claimed, were procompetitive: that they protect against 
trademark infringement and that they saved litigation costs. The 
Commission found neither justification valid to support the restraints 
at issue, and 1-800 shows no error in those findings. 
A. 1-800’s Trademark Protection Claims Do Not Justify 
Its Advertising Restraints 
As the Commission recognized, protection of trademark rights can 
be a legitimate procompetitive justification for a restraint on infringing 
advertising—but only if the justification is factually credible and the 
means of protection sufficiently tailored. “Even if an anticompetitive 
restraint is intended to achieve a legitimate objective,” it “only survives 
a rule of reason analysis if it is reasonably necessary to achieve the 
legitimate objectives proffered by the defendant.” United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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The Commission therefore had to assess “whether comparable 
benefits could be achieved through a substantially less restrictive 
alternative.” Id. As the leading antitrust treatise puts it, a 
procompetitive justification “will be lost if the plaintiff shows that the 
objective can be achieved by a substantially less restrictive alternative.” 
Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶1502. “Less restrictive alternatives are ‘those 
that would be less prejudicial to competition as a whole.’” North Am. 
Soccer League, 883 F.3d at 45 (quoting Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 
543). 
1-800’s trademark interests cannot, therefore, justify its restraints 
if those interests could have been protected by something less 
anticompetitive than a complete ban on trademark keyword 
advertising. A trademark protects only against the likelihood of 
consumer confusion—“the crucial issue” for determining infringement. 
Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 
1978). If a trademark “becomes a tool to circumvent free enterprise and 
unbridled competition … the rights enjoyed by its ownership [must] be 
kept within their proper bounds.” Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 
U.S. 562, 576 n.11 (1972) (cleaned up). Otherwise, intellectual property 
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rights would improperly “confer a privilege to violate the antitrust 
laws.” Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 63. 
The Commission properly determined that 1-800 could have 
protected its trademark interests through less restrictive means by 
limiting the content of ads rather than eliminating them altogether. 
Instead of tailoring the restrictions to eliminate confusion, however, 1-
800 broadly restricted competitive advertisements even when there was 
no possibility of confusion. For example, 1-800’s restrictions would 
prohibit ads, prompted by a trademark keyword search, saying “We are 
Lens.com, not 1-800 Contacts, and we offer better prices then they do.” 
Even more egregiously, the negative keyword requirement prohibits 
competitive advertisements when a competitor does not even use the 
trademarks. A “clear disclosure in each search advertisement of the 
identity of the rival seller” would have protected 1-800’s trademark 
rights while still allowing head-to-head competition. Op. 27 [JA   ]. 
Courts have found similar disclosures, clearly identifying the source of 
an advertisement, effective to prevent consumer confusion from 
keyword ads. See Multi Time Machine, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 804 
F.3d 930, 937-39 (9th Cir. 2015); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck 
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Tours, LLC, 527 F. Supp.2d 205 (D. Mass. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 
531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008). Indeed, the Tenth Circuit emphasized, in 
rejecting 1-800’s infringement claims, that consumer confusion would be 
unlikely “when the entry is clearly labeled as an advertisement and 
clearly identifies the source, which has a name quite different from the 
business being searched for.” 1-800 Contacts, 722 F.3d at 1245. 
1-800 offers no reason why consumers would be confused by 
merely seeing a rival’s advertisement in response to a search for “1-800 
Contacts”—and would be so confused regardless of what the ad says. 
The Commission found that the evidence (including a consumer survey) 
showed a de minimis likelihood of confusion, Op. 28 [JA   ] (citing 
CX8008_008-010 (Jacoby Expert Report) [JA   -   ]; Jacoby Tr. 2130 [JA   
]), and held as a matter of fact that the claim of confusion did not meet 
“a minimum threshold of validity” sufficient to justify the scope of the 
restraints imposed by the agreements. Op. 40 [JA   ]. 
Expert testimony revealed a “solidifying consensus” among both 
courts and academics “on the lack of confusion” posed by keyword 
search advertising, absent confusion caused by the advertising text. 
CX8014 ¶24 (Tushnet Rebuttal Expert Report) [JA   ]; see id. ¶28 
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(collecting cases) [JA   ].13 The Commission identified 16 decisions 
rejecting keyword bidding infringement claims and noted the paucity of 
decisions finding “bidding on trademark keywords to constitute 
trademark infringement, absent some additional factor,” such as 
misleading advertisement text. Op. 38-39 & n.43 [JA   -   ].14 
The single case that 1-800 litigated to final judgment rejected the 
claimed confusion. The Tenth Circuit explained that any inference of 
consumer confusion is “unnatural” where an advertisement, prompted 
by a search inquiry, “clearly identifies the source, which has a name 
quite different from the business being searched for.” 1-800 Contacts v. 
Lens.com, 722 F.3d at 1245. All the analytical indicia of confusion, in 
fact, “firmly support[ed] the unlikelihood of confusion.” Id. (emphasis 
                                      
13 Two scholars analyzed consumer understanding of 2500 different 
trademark-based internet searches and found “little evidence” of 
consumer confusion. David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, 
Trademarks As Keywords: Much Ado About Something?, 26 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 481, 483-84 (2013). 
14 Only one outlier decision, from over a decade ago, has held that 
keyword bidding by itself can amount to trademark infringement. See 
Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp.2d 1118 (D. 
Ariz. 2008). 
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added).15 See also Alzheimer’s Disease and Related Disorders Ass’n, Inc. 
v. Alzheimer’s Foundation of Am., Inc., 307 F. Supp.3d 260, 287 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“diversion” of customers by keyword bidding “without 
any hint of confusion, is not enough” for infringement). 
The “scholarly consensus” is aligned with the judicial opinions. 
CX8014 ¶24 (Tushnet Rebuttal Expert Report) (collecting articles) [JA   
]. The leading treatise on trademark law advises that a “web user may 
be ‘distracted’ or ‘diverted’ by the search engine displaying ads for other 
sources,” but “distraction or diversion is not the same as ‘confusion’ by 
the web shopper.” J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 25A:8 (5th ed. & Supp. 2018 update). 
1-800 offers nothing to counter the Commission’s determination 
that its weak claim of consumer confusion is insufficient to justify its 
broad agreements. It argues instead that unless its lawsuits were 
shams, the Commission was required to accept the resulting 
                                      
15 The district court in that case “question[ed] whether” an agreement 
not to use keyword advertisements would “survive an antitrust 
challenge” because 1-800 “does not seek merely to preclude usage of its 
trademark,” but “wants to obliterate any other competitor 
advertisement.” 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. Lens.com, Inc., 755 F. Supp.2d 
1151, 1188 (D. Utah 2010). The court noted that a “trademark right 
does not grant its owner the right to stamp out every competitor 
advertisement.” Id. 
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settlements without further inquiry. Br. 78. But the Commission is not 
required to accept a sweeping restriction on competitive advertising 
that rests on a feeble legal theory, even if it is not so empty as to be a 
sham. As this Court has recognized, a “minimal or moderate amount of 
potential confusion” can be “cured effectively by use of a disclaimer.” 
Soltex Polymer Corp. v. Fortex Indus., Inc., 832 F.2d 1325, 1330 (2d Cir. 
1987). 
Nor does it excuse 1-800’s conduct that at the time 1-800 began 
entering into its agreements, the legal consensus on whether trademark 
protection applied to keyword bidding was less clear than it is now. 1-
800 continued to enter and enforce agreements long after courts had 
rejected the idea that keyword bidding alone is confusing. And 1-800’s 
grandfathering principle cannot be reconciled with Actavis, where the 
reverse-payment agreement was not obviously unlawful when it was 
executed (indeed, lower courts had rejected FTC challenges to similar 
agreements), yet the Court subjected it to antitrust scrutiny. 
1-800 next tries to sidestep the Commission’s finding that clear 
disclosures are an effective and less restrictive means of protecting 
1-800 trademarks by claiming that Clorox requires the agency to defer 
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to the settling parties’ determination of the appropriate scope of their 
settlement agreement. Br. 80 (citing Clorox, 117 F.3d at 60). Clorox did 
not simply defer to the parties’ agreement; it analyzed the agreement 
and found it consistent with antitrust principles. Moreover, it is one 
thing to give settling parties latitude when deciding whether to allow 
one party to renege on the deal, and another thing entirely when a 
government antitrust enforcer challenges a private conspiracy to violate 
the antitrust laws. 
Nor did the Commission violate any principle of Clorox by 
“effectively dictat[ing] that the only way that anyone can settle these 
types of infringement claims is through use of disclosures.” Br. 82. The 
Commission identified two other ways to settle a trademark dispute 
that would be less restrictive of competition while protecting 1-800’s 
rights. Op. 27 [JA   ]. It focused on disclosures because they present a 
common and effective solution. Id. 29 [JA   ]. The Commission left 
ample room for resolutions of trademark disputes that do not 
unreasonably interfere with competition. 
That courts have approved settlement agreements like those here 
does not make them valid under antitrust law. Br. 78-79. As the 
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Commission pointed out, courts approving agreed-upon settlements 
may have given “no or little consideration” to “the effects [of the 
agreement] on competition.” Op. 27 [JA   ]. That the court approved the 
private parties’ broad injunction “does not constitute an endorsement of 
the private agreements here or render them procompetitive.” Id. 
Otherwise, parties could grant themselves antitrust immunity for 
anticompetitive conduct simply by suing and settling. 
Nor is there any merit to the argument that “an antitrust 
determination” cannot be based on “the strength of the underlying 
[intellectual property] claim.” Br. 41 (citing In re Tamoxifen Citrate 
Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 204 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated by Actavis, 
570 U.S. 136). The Commission did not adjudicate the merits of a 
trademark infringement claim. It rejected 1-800’s theory of trademark 
protection as a justification for an overbroad ban on advertisements 
that themselves pose no risk of consumer confusion. It held that less 
restrictive alternatives would protect the trademark interests just as 
well. Op. 40 [JA   ]. 
1-800 asserts throughout its brief that because it invested 
substantial resources building its brand, it deserves protection from 
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competitors piggybacking on its name. Br. 3, 21, 39, 58. Amicus 
Washington Legal Foundation devotes much of its brief to this “free-
riding” argument. 1-800 raised no such argument before the 
Commission, and “[a]rguments raised for the first time on appeal are 
deemed waived.” Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 163 (2d 
Cir. 2011); accord Dalberth v. Xerox Corp., 766 F.3d 172, 184 (2d Cir. 
2014). 
The claim fails in any event because it wrongly conflates 
trademark protection and patent protection. Unlike a patent, 1-800’s 
trademarks do not give it a right to prevent competitors from using its 
trademarks; they grant only a right against confusing use. In the 
absence of consumer confusion, 1-800 may not prevent competitors from 
targeting its brand; that’s simply the nature of competition. See Kellogg 
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938). It is no different 
from a non-brand gas station opening next to a famous-name one with a 
prominent highway sign. Drivers may be lured by the sign and the 
brand (which both cost money to build), but consumers are helped by 
the presence of a cheaper alternative, and they are not confused that 
they are buying ExxonMobil when they go to the no-name station. If the 
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idea were correct, the first advertiser of a product would effectively 
have a property right to suppress advertising targeted against it by 
name, a prospect the D.C. Circuit called “nothing less than a frontal 
assault on the basic policy of the Sherman Act.” PolyGram, 416 F.3d. at 
38 (cleaned up).16 
This Court has recognized as legitimate the directly analogous 
practice of a drug store placing “its own store-brand generic products 
next to the trademarked products they emulate in order to induce a 
customer who has specifically sought out the trademarked product to 
consider the store’s less-expensive alternative.” 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.Com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 411 (2d Cir. 2005). Online search 
advertising “plays the same role as physical proximity: enabling 
competitors to find consumers where those consumers are looking.” 
CX8014 ¶24 (Tushnet Rebuttal Expert Report) [JA   ]. 
Finally, 1-800 claims that its advertising and bidding restrictions 
facilitate ease-of-monitoring and certainty. Br. 81. But the Commission 
found that those goals can be achieved equally effectively, yet consistent 
                                      
16 The elimination of free-riding can be a legitimate defense when a 
restraint of trade is ancillary to a competition-enhancing arrangement, 
such as a joint venture. See Polk Bros., 776 F.2d at 188-91. This case 
presents no such ancillary benefit. 
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with principles of fair competition, with clear disclosures of the 
advertiser’s identity. The record showed that 1-800 diligently monitors 
the use of its trademarks in online search queries. Op. 7 [JA   ]. 1-800 
has not shown that assuring compliance with a disclosure requirement 
is more burdensome or less certain than the monitoring it already does. 
B. 1-800 Failed to Show That Its Litigation Savings 
Justify Its Advertising Restrictions 
The Commission also rightly rejected litigation savings as a 
procompetitive justification. Op. 37 [JA   ]. Any settlement will save 
“litigation costs.” But that alone cannot justify overbroad restrictions on 
advertising when less anticompetitive terms are also available. 
Furthermore, “mere profitability or cost savings have not qualified as a 
defense under the antitrust laws.” Op. 37 [JA   ] (quoting Law v. NCAA, 
134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir. 1998)). Rather, the defendant must show 
“a procompetitive rationale for the restraint.” American Express, 138 S. 
Ct. at 2284 (emphasis added); accord Indiana Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459; 
Capital Imaging, 996 F.2d at 543; see Polygram, 416 F.3d at 37-38 
(enhancing profitability is not a procompetitive justification). General 
welfare benefits are not enough. Otherwise, the call for a justification 
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would amount to no more than a showing that the anticompetitive 
conduct made economic sense for the offender. 
While the claimed savings may have benefited 1-800’s bottom line, 
1-800 failed to “connect” them to any “consumer benefits.” Chicago 
Prof’l Sports, L.P. v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 961 F.2d 667, 674 (7th Cir. 
1992). It has not shown, for example, that savings are passed on to 
consumers in the form of lower prices, that they benefit competition in 
improved service quality or in any other way.17 Capital savings are not 
cognizable efficiencies in and of themselves. See Op. 37 [JA   ] (citing 
FTC v. Penn State Hershey Med. Ctr., 838 F.3d 327, 350 (3d Cir. 2016); 
Law, 134 F.3d at 1023); see ID at 167-68 [JA   -   ] (citing additional 
cases). Nor has 1-800 rebutted the FTC’s showing that less restrictive 
alternatives were available to 1-800 to settle its cases. Op. 27-30 [JA    -   
]. Therefore, 1-800’s litigation savings cannot justify the anticompetitive 
harm of these restrictions.18  
                                      
17 The Commission did not restrict 1-800 to showing benefits only in 
the form of lower prices; 1-800 failed to introduce evidence of any 
benefit to competition or consumers. 
18 1-800’s agreement with Luxottica did not settle any litigation and 
could not have led to any cost savings. Op. 37 [JA   ]. 
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1-800 claims that Actavis and American Express “rejected the 
notion that there needs to be proof of pass on,” Br. 77-78, but that is 
incorrect. Actavis noted—as did the Commission, see Op. 23 [JA   ]—
that, in the abstract, saving litigation costs can be a cognizable 
efficiency under the antitrust laws. 570 U.S. at 156. But Actavis did not 
examine the factual basis of an actual justification claim. American 
Express is entirely inapposite. That case did not deal at all with 
litigation savings as a procompetitive benefit, and the Court in fact 
limited its analysis to the first step of the rule of reason. 138 S. Ct. at 
2290. At any rate, the Court found a direct competitive benefit of the 
conduct at issue because “Amex uses its higher merchant fees to offer 
its cardholders a more robust rewards program.” 138 S. Ct. at 2288. 
 THE COMMISSION CORRECTLY CONDEMNED THE LUXOTTICA 
AGREEMENT’S RESTRAINTS AS ANTICOMPETITIVE 
1-800 claims that its agreement with Luxottica is a vertical 
arrangement with unique procompetitive benefits, which the 
Commission wrongly ignored when it grouped that agreement together 
with the litigation settlements. Br. 82-83. 1-800 waived the argument 
by failing to raise it before either the ALJ or the Commission, despite 
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numerous opportunities.19 Millea, 658 F.3d at 163; Dalberth, 766 F.3d 
at 184. 
Even if it were properly raised, the argument lacks merit. The 
advertising restriction that 1-800 and Luxottica agreed to pertains to a 
horizontal relationship. In addition to its brick-and-mortar stores, 
Luxottica “also operates internet websites for these stores,” where “a 
consumer can purchase contact lenses … on the chain’s website.” IDF 
86, 88 [JA   ]. Luxottica also owns online retailer “glasses.com.” 
CX9027_011 (Larson Dep.) [JA   ]. 1-800’s fulfillment and sourcing 
services under the agreement do not extend to Luxottica’s online 
business. CX9001_223-25 (Bethers IHT) [JA   -   ]. Therefore, when it 
comes to online contact lens sales, 1-800 and Luxottica are horizontal 
competitors—just like the other rivals with whom 1-800 agreed to 
restrain online search advertising. See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 
579 F.2d 126, 131-32 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc). Similar restraints 
between competitors who share both vertical and horizontal 
                                      
19 See 1-800 Contacts’ Post-Trial Brief, FTC Dkt. 9372 (June 15, 2017); 
1-800 Contacts’ Corrected Post-Trial Reply Brief, FTC Dkt. 9372 (July 
20, 2017); Respondent’s Brief on Appeal, FTC Dkt. 9372 (Dec. 6, 2017); 
Respondent’s Reply Brief on Appeal, FTC Dkt. 9372 (Feb. 21, 2018); 
Oral Argument Transcript, FTC Dkt. 9372 (June 26, 2018). 
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relationships have been condemned by the courts. E.g., Topco Assocs., 
405 U.S. at 608-09; United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 352 
(1967). 
And even to the degree the relationship is vertical, 1-800 has not 
shown that anti-advertising agreements enhance its efficiency. 1-800 
provides “fulfillment services by shipping contact lenses to Luxottica’s 
retail chain stores” and “assistance with sourcing contact lenses.” IDF 
394 [JA   ]. 1-800 does not explain the relevance of advertising to that 
arrangement. 
 THE TERMS OF THE COMMISSION’S REMEDIAL ORDER ARE WELL 
WITHIN ITS DISCRETION 
Once a violation of the FTC Act has been established, the FTC has 
considerable discretion to fashion an effective remedy. FTC v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 392 (1965); FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 
U.S. 419, 428-29 (1957); Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608, 611-13 
(1946). The Commission’s Final Order is a proper exercise of that 
discretion, reasonably tailored to remediate the harm caused by 1-800’s 
restraints and prevent a recurrence of those violations. See 15 U.S.C. 
§ 45(a)(2). 
101 
1-800 claims that Section II.C of the Commission’s Order [JA   ] 
(prohibiting agreements that limit “truthful, non-deceptive, and non-
infringing advertising or promotion”) is overbroad because it applies to 
all advertising and not just the search advertising that gave rise to this 
case. Br. 86-87. 
As 1-800 concedes (Br. 86 n.27), “the Commission is not limited to 
prohibiting the illegal practice in the precise form in which it is found to 
have existed in the past.” FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 
(1952); accord Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 738 F.2d 554, 561 (2d Cir. 
1984) (affirming FTC’s “fencing-in” authority). An FTC order is proper if 
the remedy bears a reasonable relationship to the unlawful conduct. 
Jacob Siegel Co., 327 U.S. at 613; Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 473; Fedders 
Corp. v. FTC, 529 F.2d 1398, 1402 (2d Cir. 1976). Here, 1-800 entered 
numerous agreements over many years that disrupted a critical means 
of advertising covering 79% of the market, even as courts indicated that 
its trademark claims were baseless. It was plainly reasonable for the 
Commission to address not only the “narrow lane” of search advertising, 
but also to “close all roads to the prohibited goal” of harming 
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competition in the online sale of contact lenses. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 
at 473. 
1-800 also claims that the Order leaves it no way to enforce its 
trademarks and settle disputes. Br. 87. In fact, the Order applies only 
to “truthful, non-deceptive, and non-infringing” advertising. Order 
§ II.C [JA   ] (emphasis added). And the Commission was careful to 
carve out 1-800’s ability to protect its trademarks through litigation, 
litigation-related communications like demand letters, and enforcement 
of court orders approving settlements. Order § II.B [JA   ]. Further, the 
Order permits 1-800 to enter settlements that preclude consumer 
confusion by requiring rivals to disclose their identities or affiliation. Id. 
§ II.D [JA   ].20 
1-800 also complains about Sections IV.B.1 and 2 of the Order, 
which, for the next five years, require 1-800 to notify the FTC of its 
communications with alleged infringers. According to 1-800, these 
provisions “increase[] enforcement costs” and “make[] it less likely that 
                                      
20 To the extent that 1-800 is arguing that Section II.C amounts to an 
impermissible “obey the law” injunction, the claim is waived. The ALJ 
correctly rejected that argument, ID 195 [JA   ], and 1-800 then 
abandoned it on appeal to the Commission. See 1-800’s Brief on Appeal, 
supra note 19, at 42-45; Reply Brief on Appeal, supra note 19, at 23-24. 
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suspected infringers will cease the infringement.” Br. 87. It is hard to 
see why. The cost of providing the required notice is surely reasonable. 
And that burden is justified by enabling the FTC to monitor 1-800’s 
compliance with the Order, as 1-800 does not dispute. Nor does 1-800 
explain how notification will lead to infringement. Notification does, 
however, rightly make it harder for 1-800 to bully its rivals into 
entering anticompetitive settlements like the ones struck down here. 
See, e.g., Tr. 242-44 (Clarkson, of AC Lens, testifying to being pressured 
to settle); Tr. 1931-34 (Holbrook, of Memorial Eye, testifying to 1-800’s 
intimidation tactics); CX0068_001 (Coon, of 1-800, acknowledging 1-
800’s reputation of “going after people.”). Should the requirements turn 
out to be more burdensome than they appear, moreover, 1-800 may ask 
the Commission to modify them. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). 
 REMAND IS NECESSARY IF THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS 
GRANTED 
1-800 asks that if the Court finds error in the Commission’s 
analysis, it simply vacate the Order without remand. Br. 83-86. The 
Court should deny that blanket request. The only scenario in which 
remand would be unnecessary is if the Court were to hold that 
trademark litigation settlements are immune from any antitrust 
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scrutiny. Any other ground for reversal would leave the Commission 
with a substantial role to play on remand. For example, if the Court 
were to determine that the Commission should have applied a different 
rule-of-reason analysis with a determination of market power, the FTC 
should be given the chance to conduct that inquiry. Similarly, if the 
Court holds that the Commission improperly weighed the harm to 
competition against the alleged procompetitive justifications, the proper 
outcome is to send the case back to the Commission to re-weigh those 
factors in the first instance in light of the Court’s holding.21 It would be 
inappropriate simply to give 1-800 the free pass it asks for. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review should be 
denied. 
                                      
21 1-800 claims (Br. 84 n.26) that there is no point in remand because 
the Commission’s theory of harm improperly requires aggregating the 
effects of all the agreements. The Commission, in examining violations 
of the FTC Act, rightly applies the principles of the Sherman Act. Op. 
11 [JA  ]. Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the relevant inquiry is 
whether the defendant’s agreements, in the aggregate, harm 
competition. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 
451, 464 (1992); Fortner Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969); 
see also Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶310c1 (“aggregation of claims may 
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